Article in EdgeScience

Dear Readers,

Here is another unashamed self-advertisement for a text I published recently in the Society of Scientific Exploration professional publication EdgeScience.

The paper is about how the Model of Pragmatic Information could be used to study various large scale anomalies. It is written in a more accessible language than my regular posts, so it should be more enjoyable.

It can be downloaded for free at http://www.scientificexploration.org/edgescience/

I hope you will enjoy and stimulate discussions.

The psi circuit: A tentative model (part 2)

This post is describing in greater details the proposed model to study the social dimension of psi effects, and UFO events in particular. The emphasis is placed today on the overall architecture upon which the model is built, and the rational for such architecture. The next post will look in more details at the individual elements of the model.

Architecture

Split between the empirical and the interpretative
The overall architecture of the model is based on a synthetic view of a number of researches in parapsychology, and especially research on psychokinesis (PK). One important finding in parapsychology is that psi effects are most likely the outcome of unconscious mental processes. This conclusion was expressed by the founder of the discipline, J. B. Rhine, already in 1954[1], and remains one of the most enduring issue in parapsychology. The issue is that if unconscious processes are at the centre of the phenomena, then it becomes very difficult to study it. North American psychology is particularly adverse to the study of the unconscious, as cognitive psychology (emphasizing conscious perception) and behaviourist psychology (emphasizing a “black box” approach through an input-output stimulation view of the human mind) are the dominant perspectives. North American parapsychology also suffered from this problem, and it can be clearly noted by the undervaluing of researchers who focussed on the unconscious such as Fodor Nandor and Jule Eisenbuld. In spite of these internal debates within psychology and parapsychology, any models of psi (and social psi included) need to locate the most dynamic portions of the phenomena under the threshold of empirical observation.

It is for this reason that the proposed model for social psi has a built-in ontological assumption that divides between empirical sociology (i.e., what can be observed through social behaviour), and what requires interpretation to understand such behaviours. The interpretative sociology has a long history and is well-established but it would be beyond the scope of this discussion to present such history here. Suffice to say that there are many sociological tools available, developed by classical sociologists such Max Weber, Georg Simmel, and more recent ones like Erving Goffman, Herbert Blumer, Alfred Schutz, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, as well as all the research conducted in the present field of “cultural studies". The key here is to not ignore what is beyond the threshold of direct observation, which would otherwise lead one to the same trap as the one positivist psychology found itself, and in my opinion the greatest barrier to the advancement of parapsychology.

The role of consciousness
The proposed model is also synthesizing some of the key findings on PK research. If unconscious processes are at the centre of psi effects, then consciousness is very much in the way when it is time to produce psi effects. It is for this reason that most parapsychologists think that spontaneous psi effects are stronger than the ones produced in laboratory or experimental settings, and that “ongoing psi on demand” is all but an impossible task. Batcheldor[2] noted that in his group PK experiment he had to use all kind of tricks to get people mind off the experiment (like using humour, playing illusionist tricks, etc.) so that the unconscious can act without interference from the consciousness. Pamela Heath, in her extensive survey of PK research[3] found that the suspension of the intellect, altered states of consciousness, dissociation, openness to emotions, meditative states were keys to produce PK effects. Once again, the conclusion is that consciousness has to be circumvented.

This fundamental issue in parapsychology is represented in the model by the difference between the red and green lines. The red line represents spontaneous psi effects which are circumventing consciousness, while the green line represents the conscious task to produce psi effects in experimental conditions that is then setup in a way where the unconscious is given a chance afterward to circumvent consciousness. Batcheldor was able to do so in his group PK experiment, although it was not easy. It is less than clear if a social-level experiment could be produced in such a way. The fact that an action would be socially known as being “an experiment”, and then finding “social-level distractions” afterward to make the social consciousness “forget” about the experiment so that a social psi effect could occur might be impossible. In other words, given the nature of social relations and social communications, I think it is nearly impossible to do social psi experimentation. The only exception would be to use unethical deception (for instance hooking up with a group of UFO believers, feeding them with believable stories about UFOs having a very particular content, and then see if some of that content emerges in future sightings where a degree of objectivity can be assessed—like multiple unconnected observers). [4] The net result, however, is that there are serious reasons for limiting research on spontaneous social psi. In turn, this has serious consequences. Predictive statements cannot be verified experimentally (the preferred approach in Western science), but only through confirming after the fact how a social psi event unfolded. This is essentially the approach used in the 1952 Washington case study.

Circular nature
The model was not presented as circle essentially due to my very limited artistic abilities. But once a psi effect occurs, it can modify behaviour, which in turn becomes a new element of one’s memory about psi. If one sees a UFO, or has a telepathic feeling, it is very likely that he or she will have a much different attitude in the future about UFOs or ESPs. The circular nature of psi is certainly validated through the well-known notion of declining results in parapsychology. When someone tend to guess correctly more often than normal, then his or her confidence is boosted which in turn is both helping the process in reinforcing the unconscious belief in psi and disabling the process by causing stressful expectations to perform. The more loops in the circuit are completed, the less likely someone will perform because the conscious stress eventually overrides the unconscious belief. In cases where expectations to perform are neutralized, then it is boredom that replaces stress but with the same declining results in the end.

In the case of spontaneous psi, however, the circuit works somewhat differently. A psi event will reinforce the belief in the paranormal, which reinforces the unconscious belief that there is “something” to it. Yet, this “something” has to be attributed to a non-human force or entity so that there is no stress related to performing (it is not me but “it” that does that), and no boredom as it is seen as something extraordinary. This issue is clearly addressed in von Lucadou’s model with the notion of “displacement”, and discussed at length in the 1952 Washington case study. From a social psi perspective, it is critical for spontaneous social psi effects to continuing occurring to have a community of believers, be it about aliens, ghosts, demons, etc., to create such a displacement. In the proposed model, this translates in the creation of new social representations, or the reinforcement of existing representations. UFOs, which are simply Unidentified Flying Objects, were rapidly equated with extra-terrestrial visitors in spite of having very little evidence to support such a view. But without such social representations, a “semi-permanent” displacement towards the non-human to explain social psi effects cannot occur at the social level. In other words, contrary to von Lucadou’s model which is dealing with small groups of people’s (family or co-workers) belief that a ghost is responsible for the events and where the events eventually dissipates , social-scale phenomena like UFOs need to be continuously reinforced by an ongoing active belief system (what would be in von Lucadou’s terminology an “ongoing displacement”). That’s one of the key differences between the individual level and the social level.

This synthesis from parapsychology plays in particular ways at each step of the circuit, and these will be discussed in the next post.


[1] Rhine, J.B. (1954). “The science of nonphysical nature”. Journal of Philosophy 51: 801-810.
[2] Batcheldor, Kenneth J. (1984). “Contributions to the theory of PK induction from sitter-group work”. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 78(2): 105-122.
[3] Heath, Pamela Rae. (2003). The PK Zone: A cross-cultural review of psychokinesis. Lincoln: iUniverse.
[4] For those who are strong believers in conspiracy theory, such an experimental scenario might be the most realistic one about UFOs, science, and governmental authorities.


Eric Ouellet © 2010

Reading Notes on Rogo’s Minds and Motion

This post is reviewing an older book about psychokinesis (PK). In spite of being written in the 1970s, much of its content remains relevant today. Rogo’s book covers mostly macro-level PK effects such as poltergeists, “thoughtography”, the Soviet experiments, the so-called Geller effect, healing, and group PK. This book constitutes a good primer for anyone interested in PK. It should be followed by reading Pamela Heath’s The PK Zone for having an updated perspective on PK. The full notice is:

Rogo, Scott.(1978). Minds and Motion: The riddle of psychokinesis. New York: Taplinger publishing.

PK as an act of creation?

It is interesting to note that Rogo came to conclusions similar to the ones of François Favre, already presented in a previous post. Favre considers that psi effects are fundamentally human acts of creation. Something new has been created, and this can be interpreted as a new information arrangement, a new node of knowledge. ESP, in this sense, is information about a person or an event (past, present, or future) that now is part of a new node (the percipient who now knows about it). As discussed previously, PK can be construed as information as well, by changing the physical information about matter (speed, size, temperature, biological functionality, etc). In this case too, a new node of information is created. For instance, the watch of a witness to an accident is stopped at the time of the accident; this is new information arrangement.

As Rogo wrote in his book, “Psychokinesis might just be the most versatile and powerful force in nature. Its range seems limitless. Just look at the effects it can produce. It can influence the fall of rolling dice and levitate tables. It can interfere with that decay rate of the piece of radioactive material and, apparently, decomposed of physical matter and then reassemble it. It can heal biological tissue yet cause burns on the skin as well. It can start fires, but grant immunity from the flames at the same time. It can knock on wood or tear it apart. It can bend metal or cause rocks to fall from the sky. It can work invisibly or appear as a mist. It can function like a lever or take on the properties of a field. It can manifest as an energy yet appear as a biological plasma. I know of no other force in nature which has so many faces, guises, or manifestations. In the universe, the only comparable phenomenon with this versatility is a man's own imagination. Perhaps this is the reason we think of PK as a mental force. It seems guided by our thoughts and even our un-verbalized desires. PK might be capable of carrying out any task we want or think it can perform. It may not necessarily be only the physical force of our will but the physical manifestation of our very imagination as well.” (p. 216)

The view of PK as an act of creation, or as a physical manifestation of our imagination, also means that PK could be considered as an idiosyncrasy. After all, if it is a physical manifestation of human creativity it is therefore part of the human realm, and the psychological, sociological, and cultural contexts leading to such a creation are key to understand the content of such manifestation. In other words, these creations are not occurring in a void; they are not pure physical effects. They are dependent on our mental constructs, i.e., the culture, historical period and society in which we are living. This view of psi, and PK in particular, is certainly congruent with a number of observations about UFOs. People see machines in the sky when it becomes possible to imagine them (i.e., airships in the late 19th century, ghost planes and ghost rockets up to the middle of the 20th century, and spacecraft just before the beginning of the space age). Similarly, apparitions of the Virgin Mary tend to occur in Roman Catholic communities; the Chuppacabra in Spanish-speaking communities. The notion of prior plausibility structure, already discussed in previous posts, should be an integral part of any study of PK.

The next logical question emerging, then, would be: how imaginable something needs to be to be imagined? Some might argue, like Carl Jung in his book Flying Saucers, that PK effects are an individual affair and can only occur in the immediate vicinity of a medium. Yet, based on our knowledge of PK, Jung`s assumption is simple wrong. If one takes the time to look at the extent of PK research, from the late 19th century to the present, one would conclude that such limitations are artificial, and are in fact only showing a limitation in Jung’s own imagination. Like Rogo wrote in answering the question “what is the range of PK? I am afraid that this question will have to remain unanswered. So far we have found no parameters or substances which can consistently inhibit its power. Nor have we found any object to small or too large to extend its influence.”(p. 233).

In view of what is known about PK presently, I think it is quite safe to say that there are no theoretical limits to PK, and the notion that UFOs are PK effects cannot be rejected on the simple basis that they are too big an object to be the outcome of PK effects. However, size may still matter.

Social dimension of PK

The most interesting chapter in Rogo’s book, from a parasociological standpoint, is the one about group PK. Rogo describes at length two classical researches involving the use of a group to produce PK: the Philip experiment[1] and the group sitter experiments conducted by Batcheldor in 1960s and 1970s[2]. These experiments are interesting in themselves, however, they also reveal a few things about the nature of collective psi. As Rogo noted, “There is another psychological factor which comes into play during group PK practices which I felt Batcheldor fails to appreciate. As Maxwell and other have argued, group-PK effects are often directed by a collective mind created by the sitters. By joining forces, several people may actually form some sort of semiautonomous will or mind which directs the PK. Now this “entity” is not “owned” by or dependent upon any single group member. It is, on the contrary, semi-independent of all of them. A PK group, therefore, can overcome ownership inhibition because the PK is really being architectured by an ego-alien personality”. (pp. 195-196)

In other words, what Rogo was saying here is that the act of creation is the one of several people, and therefore from an individual perspective, there are elements or portions of the creation that will be foreign to each specific individual. Hence, the commonly described feeling of an “alien” presence when these PK effects occur, be it a ghost, a spirit, the Virgin Mary, or aliens from outer space. The key here is to recognize that there are two levels of reality involved: the individual perception and participation in the PK effect, and the collective output. A failure to recognize that the output is actually a collective effort, a composite creation, leads people to believe that there is a non-human entity involved. In a way, group PK is like any other creative group efforts, and this can be nicely illustrated by the famous joke: “Do you know what a camel is? It is a horse drawn by a committee…”.

The content of a psi effect is not only affected by the collective nature of the creative act, but also by the strength, or numinosity, of the effect. Rogo wrote that “Despite these psychological considerations, there are probably paranormal reasons why groups are better able to develop PK than individuals are. There are two psychic factors which I believe come into play here. First, while an individual may not have any appreciable PK himself, a group of people working together might be able to build up a formidable collective PK force as each person contributes his share of psychic force to the group’s total PK output. In fact, we might expect a group of people to produce stronger PK than a randomly selected individual could.” (p. 197)

It is an extremely common phenomenon in pretty much all aspects of reality, be it physical, biological, sociological or psychological: the more energy one puts in a system, the bigger the effect is likely to be. Why should it be different for psi? Based on our existing knowledge of psi, there are no theoretical reasons to have an exception for psi in this regard. What Rogo did not discuss, however, is what happens if the collective is a large one, a social group, a large segment of a community? The logical extension would be a larger social psi effect, and one that is appearing as even more strange to any given individual, as his or her share of participation in the effect is even smaller in relative terms.

Another point that Rogo brings is that in collective psi effect, a division of labor creates synergistic outputs that are stronger. This notion is, after all, the central principle upon which modern organizations, and modern capitalism, are built on: a given number of organized individuals have more output than the same sum of disorganized individuals. It is what the military describe under the notion of “force multiplication”. As Rogo noted, “Now let’s turn to a second factor which I think contributes to the success of group-PK techniques. […] It could be that PK works best when a group of people are present who can contribute the PK while another person (or persons) is on hand who is able to manipulate it. It might be considerably harder for one single individual to contribute, generate, and channel PK all by himself. In a group setting, a division of these factors may take place. (p 197).

This comment from Rogo brings the issue of experiment-based psi effect versus spontaneous ones. In parapsychology, there is a relatively accepted notion that psi effects produced through experimentation tend to be weaker than spontaneous ones. The reason invoked is that psi, being produced through unconscious mental processes, is maximized when the unconscious is allowed to be in its normal and “natural” environment. During an experiment, people are aware that they are there to “produce”, and this creates unconscious inhibitions. That is problem is described more generally by psychologists as the “third variable” issue. Yet, group PK experiments tend to show much stronger results than individual PK ones. One can only imagine the strength of a social and spontaneous psi effect.

The experimentation problem

Rogo made an important comment that needs to be analyzed further. He wrote that “Group-PK phenomena just may be the most important aspect of psychic phenomena we can explore.” (p. 197). If it is so (and I agree with his statement), then why parapsychologists do not do more of such group PK experimental research? I think there are two reasons for that. The first one is that most people involved in parapsychology are not interested or trained to look beyond the individual. This is the individualistic reporting bias of parapsychology already discussed in a previous post. The second reason is that group PK research, in concrete terms, looks a lot like the séance of the psychical research era. Parapsychology was created by J.B. Rhine with the very intent of staying away from the séance business, as it was perceived as bringing much disrespect to serious research. This state of affair is unfortunate, as group PK research could help informing parasociology.

This difficulty is compounded by the fact that experimentation at the social level experimentation is highly problematic. One could imagine an experiment that would go as follow: find a mid-size community that is somewhat geographically isolated, and somewhat economically depressed (like a mining community in North America). Get a secret arrangement with the local cable and a TV network to insert subliminal images of UFOs (one frame out of the 25 per second) during the most watch shows for several weeks. The image should show UFOs having a liberating and positive effect so they constitute an unconscious “escape” from the economically depressed community. Also ensure that there is an airport nearby with a radar station, and ideally that the town has a UFO club. If there is an increase in quality UFO sighting reports and ideally some inexplicable radar tracings in the following weeks, then the hypothesis could be verified.

Obviously, such experiment would not pass any research ethics committee as it involves deception and there is nothing good for the community involved. As well, no cable and TV network companies would take such risk for their reputation. But it is possible to say that the UFO parasociological hypothesis is falsifiable. But better experiments will have to be found.

[1] For more see Owen, Iris M. and M. Sparrow. (1976). Conjuring up Philip: An Adventure In Psychokinesis. Harper & Row.

[2] For more see Batcheldor, Kenneth. (1966). "Report on a Case of Table-Levitation and Associated Phenomena." Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 43; (1984). "Contributions to the Theory of PK Induction from Sitter-Group Work." Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 78; (1994). "Notes on the Elusiveness Problem in Relation to a Radical View of Paranormality." Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 88; Batcheldor, Kenneth, and D. W. Hunt. "Some Experiments in Psychokinesis." Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 43 (1966).

Eric Ouellet © 2010

Rupert Sheldrake’s The Presence of the Past

As announced a few posts ago, I am reviewing one of the main books of Rupert Sheldrake. The one chosen is trying to link observations in the social and cultural realms with his concept of morphic resonance. Although there are some interesting ideas in it, I must say that I am a bit disappointed, as it does not provide a whole lot more to what has already been discussed so far. Yet, it was still a worthwhile reading. The full notice is:

Sheldrake, Rupert. (1989). The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature. New York: Vintage Books.

Morphic fields and sociology

This book represents further application of his biological ideas developed in A New Science of Life (1981) to the realms of psychology, society, and culture (p. vii). Yet, nearly half of the book is dealing with issues linked to the outdated 19th century mechanistic views of science that are still prevalent today. Among those views, one can find the hope of finding all the eternal and immutable laws of nature. For him, a central problem is that reality fundamentally changes, and thus our understanding of it must also evolve. It is to address this problem that he developed the notion of morphogenetic fields, which “evolve within the realm of nature, and they are influenced by what has happened before. Habits build up within them. From this point of view, mathematical models of these fields are only models; they do not represent transcendent mathematical realities that determine the fields” (p. 107).

Social sciences are about studying collective and long-lasting, but not eternal, idiosyncrasies which have “laws” of their own, but as these idiosyncrasies change over time, so the “laws” to explain them will change. If one translates in the language of the social science the above quote, it would look like this: social structuration in social classes evolves within societies, and is influenced by previous social forms. It is only with time that new social forms become accepted and integrated in a society, and the models and theories to explain them are specific to those societies, and do not determine social structuration. No one in social science would be shocked by such “translation”. It is certainly an issue and challenge for the natural sciences, but when it comes to the human and social sciences this is not a major issue.

Sheldrake appears aware of this, as he wrote later in the book, that sociology has abandoned in the 1960s such pretensions of finding eternal laws of society (pp. 254-255), especially through the disrepute of the functionalism and structuralism. From that point of view, it is clear that his book was not addressed to people in the social sciences. This is a bit disturbing, as they would be the only ones to be really able to embrace his concept in the context of what this books intend to do. It is unfortunate that Sheldrake missed such an opportunity to establish a dialogue with the social science community, but I guess his main “demons” were somewhere else...

This lack of dialogue appears to remain to this day. I did a relatively extensive search for social science journal articles that would use Sheldrake’s ideas, and to my surprise I found none. I think a number of reasons can be invoked to explain this situation: conservatism of those journals vis-à-vis his unconventional views (yet some of them in cultural studies are all but conservative); Sheldrake’s inability to reach out to the social science communities, as morphic resonance is expressed in ways that are not easy to integrate within existing models and theories from social sciences (something he recognizes himself – p. 309), etc. But I think the most important reason for this lack of interest is that Sheldrake’s ideas provide nothing new to the social sciences. This can be seen as a mixed blessing. On one hand, this confirms that most findings in sociology remain essentially valid, even with a morphic fields “update”. On the other hand, as it does not provide anything really new, then why should one bother using this concept?

Morphic fields and resonance in sociology

The notion of morphic field is actually quite similar to the way sociological concepts and theories are devised. Morphic fields are constructs that are comparable to the notions of social force and dynamics, which are common concepts in sociology to describe abstract realities that have a real impact, such as social classes, social institutions. But his approach is starting from the natural sciences and tries to go towards the social sciences. As Sheldrake wrote, “the hypothesis of formative causation, which the rest of this book explores, starts from the assumption that morphogenetic fields are physically real, in the sense that gravitational, electro-magnetic, and quantum matter fields are real” (pp. 107-108). It would be interesting to do the reverse exercise, using social science concepts to describe biology.

What morphic fields do, as a concept, is to provide an explanatory structure to understand why biological shapes and behaviours remain the same over time, and that they tend to spread without always have a direct cause-and-effect to account for it. Within a morphic field, there is a process that makes it stronger and more established through time, which he calls morphic resonance. “Morphic resonance takes place on the basis of similarity. The more similar an organism is to previous organisms, the greater their influence on its morphic resonance. And the more such organisms there have been, the more powerful their cumulative influence” (p. 108). In other words, according to Sheldrake, the more nature is the same, the more it will remain the same. This idea, once transposed, is very similar to the underpinnings of concepts such as primary and secondary socialization, and of institutionalization in sociology, which are built on the notion of repetition.

Sheldrake adds that “by contrast, the hypothesis of formative causation postulates a two-way flow of influence: from fields to organism and from organism to fields” (p. 110). What he means here is that not only the overall structure of the field influences individual organisms in terms of the shape and behaviour, but individual organisms also influence the field. Here too, there is nothing new for sociology. The overall construct of sociological theories is based on that very notion of a two-way process, where the structural and functionalist theories emphasize the top-down part of social processes, while the agency-based and critical theories are all about understanding how individuals can voluntarily induce social change.

For organisms to keep their shape and behaviour over generations, Sheldrake postulates that some sort of memory is required so that organism “knows” what to do. Hence, morphic fields are also memory containers. But he goes further in saying that the information contained in the field seems to spread without always having direct cause-and-effect. “Morphic fields play a role comparable to information and programs in conventional biological thought, and they can indeed be regarded as fields of information. Thinking of information as contained in morphic fields helps to demystify this concept, which otherwise seems to be referring to something that is essentially abstract, mental, or mathematical, or at any rate non-physical in nature” (p. 113). Once again, through key concepts like class and professional socialization, or Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, one knows that social behaviour is filled with information (such as rules of conducts, norms and values). Sheldrake acknowledges this similarity (p. 262). The main difference is the non-causal spread of information which is not really discussed in sociology. More on this below.

One more point, Sheldrake denounces strong determinism through his concept of morphic fields. If organisms tend to have similar shapes and behaviour, they do not have the exact same. There is room for variation (like African pigmies and tall Scandinavians are still part of the same specie). He wrote that “an essential feature of morphic fields is that they are intrinsically probabilistic; in other words they are not sharply defined but are ‘structures of probability” (p. 119). What he means is that within the range of possible outcomes that a field can tolerate, it is impossible to predict how a specific organism or individual would behave. This notion is well understood in sociology. For instance, someone who is born in a working class background has a greater probability to have later on habits, language, demeanour, employment, and housing congruent with what exists in general in the working class. But there are always a number of individual who will arrive to a different outcome, some to become very rich and powerful. Yet, it is impossible to predict which individual will change social class in such a way.

Sheldrake acknowledges that his theories are difficult to test in a human setting as there are too many variables at play (pp, 183, 186-187, and 188). As well, he recognizes that social and cultural realities, if they can be understood as morphic fields, they have to be studied in their own terms. As he underlines, “social and cultural fields are of a nature similar to the morphic fields that organize biological and chemical systems, although they are not, or course, reducible to these biological and chemical fields. Like the morphic fields of systems at all levels of complexity, social and cultural fields are stabilized by morphic resonance from similar systems in the past [...]” (pp. 254-255). Lastly, he recognizes that his concept of morphic fields does not explain well how new morphic fields emerge, while in social science the issue of how social change occur is the fundamental question (pp. 114 and 246).

A bridge not so far

In spite of these limitations, I think Sheldrake provides some interesting points that would be well received in social sciences, or at least better received than in natural sciences. For instance, Sheldrake provides a convincing analysis to show that the notion of instinctive behaviour through genetic explanation is over-rated (p. 158), and this is congruent with the devastating critique opposed to socio-biology.

As well, Sheldrake is very critical of those who try to reduce human behaviour to brain chemistry; a critique whole-heartily shared by most sociologists. “According to the hypothesis of formative causation, the morphic fields that organize our behaviour are not confined to the brain, or even the body, but extend beyond it into the environment, linking the body to the surroundings in which it acts” (p. 198).

Another linkage can be made with the study of social institutions, a key notion in sociology and anthropology. The famous anthropologist Mary Douglas described in her master piece on social institutions, How Institutions Thinks (1987), how institutions does the thinking for individuals in providing mental thought patterns as to how we should look at the world; what she called the classification schemes. Sheldrake proposes a similar construct to understand how information is stored in morphic fields. “From the point of view of the hypothesis of formative causation, such schemata, hierarchies, or organizational factors can be regarded as morphic fields, organized in hierarchies and connected together in multiple ways through higher fields” (p. 200). Institutions behave in a manner that is congruent with the morphic field explanatory structure.

Sheldrake provides also an interesting way of re-energizing Durkheim’s concept of conscience collective, which has lost favour in sociology. Conscience collective is used to describe something that could be also called group mind, to explain social behaviour. Conscience collective could be seen as a morphic field containing the conscious collective memories of a society (pp. 248-255), and that is built and maintained through ongoing generations of people getting the same story about their society (be it true or not, like in the case of nationalism, or Canada is the “most best” country in the world...).

Morphic fields and resonance and parasociology

Where Sheldrake becomes more contentious is where, I think, he is becoming more interesting for the purpose of parasociology. One of the key aspects of morphic fields is that the content of the information found in the field is not necessarily communicated through a normal cause-and-effect process. For instance, he considers that all individuals inherit their species’ collective memory (p. 159), but such memory is not necessarily stored physically and that the past can influence the present directly (p. 160). As he wrote, “if the hypothesis of formative causation is correct, then it should be possible for habit memories of one organism to influence another by morphic resonance, facilitating the acquisition of the same habits. Such an effect would not, of course, be expected on the basis of mechanistic theories of memory storage” (p. 168)

To support his view that collective knowledge is shared through non-direct means, he provides the example of some research done of unconnected groups of rats learning faster over several generations how to get through a maze (p. 175-176). As well, he presents the research on blue tits birds opening milk bottle foil caps, first noticed in 1921 and spreading across the UK and some parts of Europe. These birds are known to travel only within a short distance from their nests (pp. 177-178). Although he agrees that normal animal learning had occurred in this case, an additional explanation is required for birds learning the trick at the same time while living far from each other. This is an important nuance. Sheldrake does not say that “normal” explanations are not good, only that they need to be complemented by something like morphic resonance for what it cannot account for. This perspective reminds me of Brunstein’s (1979) notion that there is a need for an “Einsteinian” revolution in other fields like biology and psychology, and I would add in sociology too.

When it comes to people, Sheldrake wrote that “[...] the principal way in which we are influenced by morphic resonance from other people may be through a kind of pooled memory“(p. 221), and he links his views to Jung’s notion of collective unconscious. Unfortunately, he does explain much how this is occurring, and the verification tests he proposes to validate his ideas in the human realm are less than convincing. But this is certainly congruent with the parasociological notion that social order is, in part, possible through psi linkages.

Overall, what he proposes is that there are unknown and unseen dimensions at play, and morphic fields helps us to sense their presence. These invisible dimensions have been hypothesized in physics (p. 297) through various theories, including the notion of non-locality (p. 304). By logical extension, there should be additional sociological dimensions that are invisible, but still having an effect on societies. This is certainly the goal of parasociology to investigate such invisible dimensions. The concept of morphic resonance can be useful, but it needs to be tested empirically in a true sociological context.

Paranormal phenomena are good candidates for such empirical testing, as the “normal” explanations are not working. UFO sightings, hauntings and alien abductions share many characteristics of morphic fields. The content of such experience is carried on in a non-causal way, and tends to stabilize over time but never become perfectly identical; the more people believe in it, the more it occurs; some individuals (like Barney and Betty Hill) can have an influence on the field, as the field can influence many, etc. With respect to spontaneous but relatively short-live paranormal events like UFO wave and RSPKs (poltergeists), Sheldrake’s concept is maybe less helpful, as it has to describe new, intense but short-lived fields. Maybe these are special forms of morphic field, or example of abrupt disruption in morphic fields. In ecology, for instance, when an ecosystem is seriously damaged, it is possible to observe very strange animal behaviours (like polar bear eating their cubs). On the human side, the days after Katrina in New Orleans also showed what could happen when social order is shattered by environmental destruction. If these examples are good illustration of deep disruptions of morphic fields, then the analogy for UFO wave and RSPKs may hold.


Eric Ouellet © 2009

Reading Notes – Parapsychology and the UFO

This post is reviewing a short and self-published book on the similarities between parapsychological phenomena and the UFO experience. It is based on an article submitted to the Journal of Parapsychology in the early 1980s, by the author, Manfred Cassirer. The article, however, was rejected because it was deemed to be of “limited interest to parapsychology”. It is important to note that although Cassirer was not warm to the ETH, his approach remains spiritist (i.e. accepts as valid explanations involving non-human entities (such as ghosts, spirits, etc.)—something that goes against the fundamental assumption of the Journal of Parapsychology that paranormal phenomena are of human-origin). This book provides an interesting overview of phenomena being quite similar to what is observed in psychical research and in ufology. Unfortunately, the very idea of using non-human entities (but non-ETs) at core of any explanation about UFOs remains at the heart of the problem (as such idea is an improvable tautology), and this book is a good illustration of this issue. The full notice is:

Cassirer, Manfred. (1988). Parapsychology and the UFO. London: n.p.

False symmetric analysis

Cassirer wrote his book as a series of short chapters trying to link the resemblances between paranormal phenomena and the UFO experience. It is the first book I found that does this comparative exercise in a direct manner, by someone who appears to know about both fields relatively well. This 62 page book has 29 chapters, covering a number of topics such as “UFO-prone = Psi-prone?”, “Malfunctioning”, “Apparitions”, “Materialization”, “ESP”, “Luminosities”, “ “Teleportation and levitation”, “Poltergeist”, etc. In spite of covering a wide array of phenomena linked to both paranormal activities and UFOs, the comparison remains based on descriptive research that does not seek to look into the deeper dynamics at play (and from that point of view it is suffering from a common “disease”, particularly virulent in the English-speaking world, that of vulgar “Hume-like empiricism”), implying that if something cannot be observed directly by the senses then it is not worth studying. In other words, Cassirer ‘s analysis repeats some of the key problems plaguing psychical research (to be distinguished from parapsychology) and ufology, where witnesses’ description are only used for the data dealing with the phenomenon at plays, ignoring for the most part what is around the phenomenon, who are the witnesses psychologically, and the symbolic dimension of what is happening. Ultimately, the analysis lacks a common unifying theme.

In turn, this Hume-like empiricism leads to Cassirer’s position (shared by many others in paranormal research) of supposedly “scientific neutrality” towards various hypotheses (i.e., UFOs and paranormal events can be produced be either human psi activities or non-human entities, terrestrial or otherwise). As he wrote, “thus we do not advocate commitment to the effect that there is an implicit ‘psychic solution’, whatever such a statement could mean. But putting these subjects into watertight compartments automatically rules out any potentially valuable cross-fertilization.” (p. 55).

It is a very common attitude in the world of paranormal research (but less in ufology) to state that one is “neutral” or “scientific” or “agnostic” (and the sophisticated ones will use the word “symmetry”) when it comes to assess the overall value of various hypotheses. But there is actually nothing “neutral” or “scientific” or “agnostic” about it, they simply surrender their capacity for critical thinking. A true symmetric analysis, as described by a number of sociologists of scientific knowledge like Bruno Latour, Steve Woolgar, David Bloor, and Harry Collins, really means that one ought to evaluate various forms of knowledge, but by using the same criteria in the same way (for instance, if one rejects any witness’ statement without having corroboration, then the same rule needs to be applied to the representatives of the government, police, and military). As well, symmetry also requires that the proponents of a theory or approach to live up to their own criteria (for instance, ETH ufologists cannot ask for (physical) “evidence” to proponents of other ufological hypotheses while they themselves cannot provide any).

Someone who is truly symmetric in his/her analysis will do the analysis, and come up with some conclusion; that is using one’s critical thinking capacities. It is the only that we can push forward our knowledge on a given topic, at the risk of discovering that we were wrong later on. But to take a position that says “who knows, it might be ghosts, it might be ETs, it might be intraterrestrials, it might be parapsychological, etc.”, is not being symmetrical; it is actually failing to do anything! Those who do nothing as describe here, oftentimes claim to do a lot of “field research.” But what they do is not scientific and is not actually doing research either, as they do not seek to prove or disprove a hypothesis; they are just fooling around. Whatever they do will not contribute to the advancement of any form of science, because they are not looking for anything in particular (as determined by a proper symmetric analysis). From that point of view, the rejection of Cassirer’s submission to the Journal of Parapsychology was well justified, but not because it was not interesting and not because he was spiritist, but rather because the article was seriously lacking in critical thinking and was hiding behind a false symmetric posture.

Some interesting points

In spite of the problems in Cassirer’s central arguments, he provides a number of interesting points. He is aware of the serious limitations of the ETH, and that the parapsychological hypothesis:

“How ‘real’ are UFO-type apparitions? By comparing accounts by naïve (?) and ‘imaginary’ contactees under hypnosis with those who genuinely claim such experiences, a strange pattern of identity in the description of the craft ‘craft’ and its occupants emerges (Lawson 1980 A). We do not know why; neither should we ignore significant differences. At any rate, the close similarities between ‘true’ and ‘false’ militate against the extra-terrestrial hypothesis, suggesting, on the contrary, links with the paranormal [...]” (p. 16)

He also underlined the deep similarities between the UFO phenomenon and psi in general, and PK in particular. “If it is of the nature of the UFO phenomenon to be ‘elusive and clandestine’ (Hendry 1980 B), so also is it of the nature of psi. [...] The PK-like effects by which cars are stalled and electronic apparatus put temporarily out of action are of the essence of ufology. UFOs are reported as shooting up and disappearing into thin air without so much as a ‘by your leave’: alternatively they simply render themselves invisible. They change their shape or divide into several units, suggesting that they are not manufactured objects but, rather, provisional or temporary structures (Zurcher 1979. 108).” (p. 20).

An important issue that was not missed by Cassirer is the “lights in the sky” is a very ancient phenomenon, and it was only recently that it was ascribed an ET meaning. “Unexplained lights, whether in the sky or indoors (illuminating ‘flying saucers’; haunted houses; séances) are a common feature of both disciplines as well as of mysticism. [...] There is, in fact, a veritable embarras de richesses regarding luminous phenomena, and a considerable volume could be dedicated to that subject alone. Luminosities in the heavens, particularly at night, may present insuperable difficulties to precise interpretation [...]” (p. 27).

Parapsychology and the UFO

Cassirer’s book title is actually misleading, and it should have been “Psychical Research and the UFO”. Descriptive comparisons between paranormal phenomena and the UFO experience are interesting and noteworthy, but it is not the real issue. It is rather the similarities in the physical, biological, psychological and social dynamics of both paranormal and UFO events that can produce strong linkages. Such linkages, in turn, are what can unify research agendas on a variety of phenomenon that appear distinct on the surface. That’s the real issue.

Eric Ouellet © 2009

Reading Notes – Dark White

This post is reviewing a 15-year old book on the alien abduction phenomenon. Although there is nothing really new in this book, it provides a very good overview of the phenomenon, as well as how it was researched, and what are the main findings since the 1970s. This confirms, however, that ufology has not produced anything of substance on this issue for quite a long time. The full notice is:

Schnabel, Jim. (1994). Dark White: Aliens, abductions, and the UFO obsession. London: Hamish Hamilton.

Beyond “nuts-and-bolts,” electromagnetism and abnormal psychology

Schnabel provides a good overview of Michael Persinger’s research on electromagnetism and UFOs, including its limitations, and the usual critiques coming from the “nuts-and-bolts” ufologists. Schnabel is quite right in underlining that a purely bio-physical approach is not sufficient,

“Moreover, the postulation of a largely subclinical continuum of ‘temporal lobe lability’ to explain odd experiences such as abduction was largely based on reports of such experiences by clinically normal people; Persinger and other such researchers did not know that such experiences always stemmed from temporal lobe lability. In fact, reports of such experiences might alternatively be seen as evidence for how widespread the abduction phenomenon had become.” (p. 160).

But then, it is also clear that the “nuts-and-bolts” ufologists have also a serious problem. Once again, this materialist ET hypothesis demands, by definition, a material proof, yet it is simply not there.

“But even so, [Budd] Hopkins and the others would have liked to see some alien artefacts, or perhaps photographic evidence that nuts-and-bolts spacecraft were zooming into abductees’ backyards in the death of the night. They couldn’t help but acknowledge that continual absence of such evidence, even as the number of abduction accounts recorded by ufologists climbed into the thousands in the late 1980s, was bothersome”. (p.162).

Although Hopkins claimed to have a case where the actual movement in the sky of an abductee was seen by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and wrote a book about it, Hopkins was actually victim of a hoax. George Hansen (2005), who investigated the case, found very easily that the people behind the claims were indeed playing a prank on Hopkins.

To explain all this, a number of psychologists proposed that are people who are more prone to fantasy, and when combined with a traumatic past, they can have very strange experiences taking the form of abduction by strange beings. Among some of psychological findings on these unusual experiences, several similarities were found between people who had near-death experiences and UFO abductions.

“The results were striking. Near-death experiences and UFO abductees to be distinct from other people—even other New Agers and ufologists—in several remarkable respects: they were relatively likely to have claimed rough childhoods, involving physical, sexual, and psychological abuse, neglect, and a negative household atmosphere overall. During childhood they were also likely to have had encounters with ‘nonphysical beings’—imaginary playmates or fairies—and were likely to consider themselves as having been psychically sensitive. They were easily hypnotizable. And often ‘blanked out’ spontaneously during routine tasks.” (p. 197).

Although powerful these findings may be, they are not sufficient to explain a number of key elements of such experiences. First, some events involve more than one individual, like the Barney and Betty Hill story. A personality-based explanation cannot provide for simultaneous individual experiences. Then, there are some cases involving independent witnesses who observe strange lights in the sky at the same that of the reported event. Once again, a personality-based explanation cannot account for such physical manifestations. Lastly, many witnesses tend to report many small details which are identical to other unrelated witness accounts, and this during the period prior to when the so-called CE4 became part of popular culture. A personality-based explanation cannot account for such cognitive similarities. The inclusion of the electromagnetic component to the personality-based findings, however, can provide some explanations for the simultaneous events, and the physical manifestations. Yet, from a statistical standpoint, such conjunction of event should be quite rare. In the end, there are still missing elements to any serious explanation. The ETH could, in theory, provide them but the ETH is pure conjecture as there is no physical evidence to support it.

The necessity to include parapsychology

Schnabel presents some of the key views of what he called the “psi school,” which appears to be in a better position to account for the missing explanatory elements to the UFO abduction syndrome. It is in this context that research in parapsychology becomes useful for understanding the UFO abductee phenomenon. As Schnabel notes, the UFO abduction scenario is very similar to other paranormal stories, and the content such stories can be explained in part by the empirical research in the parapsychology, and thus pointing towards a fundamentally human origin of these experiences.

“The literature in demonology, ghosts, and sorcery was full of examples where different people had experienced the same imagery, despite that imagery being non-photogenic. The mechanism was unknown but it seemed clear, from anecdotal evidence as well as from parapsychological ‘remote-viewing’ experiments, that two persons with sufficient empathy and/or psychic ability could communicate information to one another through unconscious telepathy, perhaps involving the same dominant-subordinate principle as that involved in mass hysteria. In cases where two or more people ‘experienced’ a close-encounter, telepathic transmission of imagery might be facilitated by the altered-state inducing factors which triggered the encounter in the first place. [...] According to the psi school, UFO abductees were people whose electromagnetic or crisis-induced or spontaneous altered-state experiences had been made to conform to the abduction lore by archetypical or cultural imagery, and by abduction researchers harbouring their own stereotyped imagery, who remained blithely ignorant of the damage they were inflicting on their subjects’ pliant minds”. (p. 148-149).

As one can notice, this description is very close to the PEMIE model I developed in earlier posts, but like most other researchers, Schnabel does not provide much explanation about what he means by “archetypical or cultural imagery” and how such imagery comes about in these experiences. Once, again, it is clear that there parasociology is needed to provide a more comprehensive explanation.

Schnabel summarizes his views about the UFO abduction syndrome as follow:

“[...] I find it difficult to ignore the evidence that, as far as UFOs themselves are concerned, there is something real and strange out there. But I also find it difficult to ignore the phenomenological, sociological, psychological, and apparent parapsychological links between alien abductions and a host of other unusual experiences. I am impressed by the evidence that these experiences have been with us for ages, never far from the levers of history, even though their actual nature has tended to be obscured by religious zealots and scientistic scoffers alike.” (p. 283).

Meaning and belief system: a methodological challenge

There is a particular point that Schnabel brings that requires special attention. He illustrates very well one of the fundamental difficulties of researching UFO, and close encounters in particular. Witnesses, as individuals or as part of a group, experience something extraordinary, and whatever one can say about it, it is something that was felt and lived at the time of the event. In other words, such event has a meaning and a symbolic force that is ultimately only available in full to the witnesses themselves. As he wrote, “I think that none of these terms can express adequately the strangeness conveyed by an abductee’s personal history, a history not as God or a fly on the wall has seen it but as the abductee has seen it, as she told it, as she has crafted—and I say this somewhat agnostically—her own mythology.” (p. 245).

But such meaning is usually acquired across time. The cultural and individual predispositions to see aliens versus fairies, for instance, are pre-event forces that will affect the meaning attached to it. Then, the post-event sharing with other people in abductees’ closer and wider social environment (to include ETH ufologist) is also contributing to shape the meaning given to the event. Further events of the same nature will just reinforce whatever meaning has been attributed to original event. The net result of all this is that the researcher, in most situations (and especially now that UFOs and aliens stories are firmly entrenched in the popular culture), is facing someone with particular beliefs and expectations about their experience. Metaphorically, the researcher is not facing a witness, but an emotionally-driven participant to a cultural trend. Such research work, thus, is not about finding “objective” facts like a detective, but much closer to an anthropologist trying to understand how other people make sense of their own reality.

This situation can be quite frustrating. From the serious people who wrote about it, and from my own experience of interviewing witnesses, I can say that if one’s line of questioning is not somehow congruent with the ETH, most witnesses will shut down. This is a serious difficulty from a methodological standpoint. Any data that would help to provide a wider meaning to the event are unconsciously evacuated by the witnesses, and anyone trying to solicit them is not welcomed because it could shatter the cherished meaning their ascribed to the event, which in turn has been fully integrated into their own self-concept as whom they are as individual. If you do not participate in the myth, then you are out of it. Schnabel eloquently described this issue:

“I listened to such stories with fascination and some sympathy, but also with frustration, for I suspect that participation in the underwordly experiences of Lucy and Nicole and their scarred sisters and brothers was off-limit to mortals like me. No sloe-eye alien, no sulphur-breathing rapist, would allow me to watch him at work or at play, or even sit for an interview. I could experience only the presence of morosely cheerful storytellers, and their stories, and their stories of stories” (p. 258).

The cultural and myth-making dimensions of the UFO abduction syndrome have already been studied by a number of anthropologists, folklorists, and sociologists. In many ways, there is little need to add to such body of literature. Given the widespread cultural expectations of UFO abductees towards the ETH, as described above, conducting empirical studies on this topic becomes decreasingly interesting for anyone engaged in understanding the underpinnings of the UFO experience. This shows, ultimately, that researching the UFO phenomenon is not something static both, epistemologically and methodologically.

Eric Ouellet © 2009

Parasociology: An update

After over a year of active posting, it is time to provide a comprehensive update as to where parasociology stands. I think it is possible to say that the foundations, challenges and future opportunities are now better known, and that the research agenda is clearer. As well, it is possible to affirm that the case of UFOs and related phenomena remains a useful test case for the new discipline.

UFOs and parasociology

Most theories in ufology have a limited empirical base to support their arguments, and it is especially true for the ETH. The ETH being a materialist hypothesis (nuts and bolts spaceships and flesh and blood aliens) require a fundamental material proof, which has not been found so far. Any other discussions about what a spaceship or an alien could or should look like can only be conjectures in the context of such materialist hypothesis. This fundamental incoherence of the ETH should be enough for any serious researcher to stay away from what the ETH has produced so far. As well, most of the empirical data is at best shallow and purely descriptive and at worst built in a Hume-like empiricist construct that forgoes any non-superficial explanation. It is therefore critical for parasociology to start from what is known to investigate the unknown.

A number of serious ufological authors (Randles 1983; Hufford 1977; Schwartz 1983; Spencer 1994) have clearly showed that there is an ontological difference between seeing an unknown object in the sky and having an encounter with non-human entities (believed to be of extra-terrestrial origin). As well, these two types of experience are oftentimes quite different from a phenomenological standpoint. It is therefore important to distinguish them appropriately. Yet, if one looks at the existing evidence, it is not possible to clearly separate physical and psycho-social dynamics, as one or both can be present in their entire spectrum from CE1 to CE3.

Some dynamics part of a larger explanation

Electromagnetism
The research has found so far that a somewhat material reality is present, and that unusual electromagnetism is often at play. A number of authors have noted that electromagnetism, either natural or artificial, is often associated with UFOs as well as with other ostentatious psi phenomena (Braud & Dennis 1989; Brovetto & Maxia 2008; Budden 1995, 1998; Devereux 1982; Fort 1923; Foshufvud 1980; Hecht & Dussault 1987; Keel 1968; Klass 1966a, 1966b; Persinger 1975, 1979, 1987, 1990; Persinger & Koren 2001; Pelegrin 1988; Poher & Vallée 1975; Schaut & Persinger 1985; Shneiderman 1987).

Common Narrative Structure
Other authors (Evans 1984; Favre 1978; Graystone 1969; Harvey-Wilson 2001; Keel 1975; Rogo 1982; Vallée 1969, Viéroudy 1978b) have noted that sightings of ETs are showing the same deep narrative structure as other non-ET apparition experiences, which points towards a common psycho-social dynamics. They tend to agree that the content of such experiences appear to be idiosyncratic and that the invariant is the structure of the experience rather than the content. To reject their arguments would require that one must explain why Marian apparitions, CE3, hauntings, etc., have so much in common while the witnesses would be supposedly dealing with completely different types of non-human entities. I am not aware of any ET ufologists or spiritualists that can offer a valid critique to reject the arguments of the authors mentioned above. As far as our knowledge extends, it is possible to say that the witnesses are somehow stimulated by an external source and they then provide the content of the experience, either through psi effects or by means of post-event interpretation.

Psychokinesis as human activity
One possible counter-argument would be that we, human, can only detect non-human entities through psi means, and that those means are always mixing up the signal with our cultural and social referents. The problem with this counter-argument is that it is improvable, as discussed in the last post. As well, we know based on the research on PK and RSPK (Fodor 1959; Gauld & Cornell 1979; Geley 1924; Heath 2003; Houran & Lange 2001; Lucadou & Zahradnik 2004; Osty & Osty 1932; Owen 1964; Puhle 2001; Rogo 1977, 1987; Roll 1972, 2003; Roll & Persinger 2001), including the Philip Experiment (Owen & Sparrow 1976), that the human mind can influence matter, to include creating or teleporting object and temporary apparitions of non-human entities through psychokinetic means. The central issue here is that any explanation of these strange events does not require the participation of any non-human entities. This is part of what is known, while hypothesizing the existence of ETs, surviving souls of the death people, etc. remain to this very day only improvable hypotheses. However hard this may be to accept for the believers, this is reality.

Belief and acceptance of the paranormal
Another dynamics could be generally labelled as “belief”, but understood as a general acceptance, consciously or unconsciously, of the possibility of paranormal events. Such belief has been found critical in a number of ways and linked to the witnesses’ prior experience (Basterfield 2001; Basterfield & Thalbourne 2001; Heath 2003; Keel 1988; Lucadou 1995; Phillips 1993; Schmeidler 1952; Spanos et al. 1993; Wiseman & Smith 1994). At a sociological level, the role of prior plausibility structures has also been shown as important in providing the basic material for making sense of these experiences (Bishop 2005; Carroll 1985; Fernandes & D’Armada 2005; Goode 2000; Méheust 1978; David-Néel 1929; Winkelman et al 1982). Furthermore, as belief plays a key role, the distinction between fraud and genuine effect has been found as unhelpful, as fraud and cheating is often necessary to stimulate genuine effects (Batcheldor 1984; Fodor 1958, 1959; Hansen 2001; Reihart 1994; Schrenck Notzing 1913). It is also quite clear that the unconscious dimensions of such belief plays the most important role in producing such effects (Eisenbud 1983; Favre 2004; Fodor 1958, 1959; Jung 1958, 1964 Rhine 1954), and therefore witnesses can be active participants in these events without even be aware of it, while attributing the events to an external force (like ETs, Virgin Mary, ghosts, etc.).

Triggers
There are two types of triggers that have been identified to explan how involuntary psychokinetic effects are created. The first one has been covered in the RSPK literature cited above, and relates to micro social dynamics dysfunctions, as well as personal trauma (Reiner 2004).The second set of triggers identified is related to macro social dynamics, which have been described as either expressions of a collective unconscious or national gestalt (Broad 1953; Clark & Coleman 1975; Fodor 1959; Freixedo 1977; Fuller 1980; Kottmeyer 1996; Radin 2006; Vallée 1992; Viéroudy 1978a), as activation of archetypical numinosity and synchronicity (Brunstein 1979; Combs & Holland 1996; Fowler 2004; Jung 1958, 1964; Rojcewicz 1987; Viéroudy 1983), or as telepathically shared events (Gurney, Myers & Podmore 1886; Orme-Johnson et al 1988; Schwartz 1983; Warcollier 1928, 1962). The diversity of explanation to make sense of the macro social triggers points to the equivocal empirical knowledge on this issue. The question, however, is not a matter as whether such macro social trigger exists as the evidence pointing in that direction is quite strong, but it is rather how does it work?

Challenges and opportunities

To answer this last question, a number of avenues have been explored. One of them was to establish a closer linkage between the individual unconscious and a collectively shared unconscious. If the sociological notion of collective consciousness and the psychoanalytical notion of collective unconscious shared the same intellectual origin (Greenwood 1990; Staude 1976), the empirical evidence to link them is sparse. From a bottom-up perspective, the tradition called group analytic offers good evidence of the impact of the collective consciousness on the individual unconscious (Dalal 2001; Furth 1992; Weinberg, Nuttman-Shwartz & Gilmore 2005; Zeddies 2002), to include creating possible psi effects (Powell 1991; Thygesen 2008). From a top-down perspective, some social scientists showed that the collective unconscious influences the individual unconscious (Anderson 1983; Castoriadis 1975; Ginach 2004; Irwin 1994; Leledakis 1995; Lévy-Strauss 1963; Machotka 1964; Senghaas-Knobloch & Volmerg 1988). There are no known researchers, however, who attempted to provide an articulated explanation as to how the collective unconscious may create individual psi events. This issue remains the crux of the matter.

One of the key issues to move forward is to develop operational concepts for empirical research. Given the amorphous nature of what is described under the label “collective unconscious” and other similar labels, most methodologies can only provide approximations (Elias 1978; King 1996; Main 2006; Shewmaker & Berenda 1962). On the other hand, there are a number of PK phenomena (including UFOs) that can be pinpointed to specific physical events. Once again, there is here an obvious ontological discrepancy between two realms of reality which requires to be bridged. Psychoanalysis, anthropology and qualitative sociology have proposed to use symbolic interpretation to bridge similar gaps. It is a step forward, but it is clearly a one-way bridge that provides an incomplete answer. As Dean (2002) as shown, interpretation can be highly problematic and might be linked to the radically non-deterministic nature of human creativity, which in turn would preclude any bridging from epistemological standpoint.

There is, however, a promising lead in the concept of morphic field developed by Rupert Sheldrake (1981, 2006). It could provide the missing elements to complete the “ontological bridging”. It will be explored in a more detailed way in future posts.

Eric Ouellet ©2009

Reading Notes – On the Trail of the Poltergeist

This post is about a classic in parapsychology written by psychoanalyst Nandor Fodor. This is an older book published in the late 1950s, and it recounts Fodor’s investigation of a famous British poltergeist case in the late 1930s. There are a number of key ideas in parapsychology that emerged from Fodor’s research. In spite of its older age, this book brings a number of useful concepts to parasociology. The full notice is:

Fodor, Nandor. (1958). On the Trail of the Poltergeist. New York: Citadel Press.

Fraud and the study of the paranormal

One of the main challenges in the study of the paranormal is the issue of fraud. The Society for Psychical Research (SPR) established a policy in the late 19th century that should someone commit fraud at any time, he or she would not be studied anymore by the SPR. This policy was adopted by other similar organizations. But this policy is erroneous in many ways. First of all, the presence of fraud does not preclude the possibility of genuine psi effects. Furthermore, as Batcheldor (1984) has shown, a bit of “cheating” helps to make people believe that they can succeed in producing psi effects. Such (unconscious) belief is a critical condition for producing psi effects. Also, it is important to note that the production of psi effects is helped when consciousness is “neutralized,” so that the unconscious can act with less constraint. Such neutralization may occur through psychological dissociation, which can be pathological or not.

One of Fodor’s key findings is that the distinction between genuine psi effects and fraud is not a useful one. What produces psi and what motivates one to enact fraud are very often coming from the same unconscious processes. Hence, as Fodor wrote about the case he investigated, “some of these happenings were self-evidential, establishing an excellent case for the supernormal range of the powers of Mrs. Forbes’s unconscious, others were of a compromising character but psychologically still very interesting. They made me incline to the analytical view that dissociated persons can work on two levels of consciousness. They may attempt fraud on one and continue it on the second in a state of genuine trance; they may also produce supernormal phenomena. In other words, the table sittings have led me to conclude that there is a genuine psychic angle in the problem of fraud and that the life of a dissociated personality must be considered as a whole and not split into departments of the genuine and the fraudulent” (p. 81).

From the point of view of UFO studies, such finding is important. A rash of UFO sightings is often accompanied with hoaxes. Yet, the symbolic content of those hoaxes is most likely feeding from the same socially shared unconscious processes. Therefore, one should not exclude fraud from the data when investigating a UFO wave, or a rash of sightings, as they provide important information. A good example of this is the Gulf Breeze incident of 1987-1988. The most common opinion is that Ed Walter engaged in fraud, as miniature models of the UFO photographed by him were found in his house. Yet, this does not preclude the possibility that he may have had a genuine UFO sighting. But what is more interesting is that it started a series of sightings in the region. Some of them were most likely night tests (or training) of seaborne missiles by the U.S. Navy (which in turn can be seen as an interesting synchronistic event), while others sightings could have been genuine psi events.

Interpretation of symbols

Another interesting element in Fodor’s book is the issue of interpreting symbols. As he wrote “there was a process of reasoning behind the apparently senseless act of the Poltergeist. It is not easy to follow it and it is never certain that our interpretation will be correct, but a little light is better than none at all. [...] The very choice of Mrs. Forbes’s apports [teleportation] impresses me as a cipher in which her tragic life-story is hidden. From wherever she got them, whether they came to her by supernormal or normal means, they had a definite meaning; they were governed by unconscious association.” (p. 217).

Without going through all his analysis, here are a few examples of what he meant. Fodor was convinced that Mrs. Forbes’ Poltergeist was linked to her repressed feelings linked to her past, as he discovered that she was victim of a pedophile when she was five. There were violet flowers appearing during the Poltergeist, which can mean “violate” (i.e. violated). There was coral appearing, which can be linked the choral that was singing when she was victimized. Her wedding night appears to have been very traumatic as well, although not because of her husband, but because of her past. Several objects appeared on their wedding anniversary. Many objects thrown by the Poltergeist were aimed at her husband (Mrs. Forbes clearly loved him consciously, but unconsciously wrongly associated him with her aggressor). Fodor’s interpretation is clearly influenced by the Freudian approach to psychoanalysis where sexual issues are central to interpretation. But his work shows that if one wants to interpret the symbolic meaning of psi events he or she must plough large (i.e. go much beyond the actual psi event) and look into a number of non-obvious symbols (like the word associations).

As shown in the posts related to the Hill story, such holistic symbolic approach can be fruitful. However, when it comes to interpret symbols linked to expressions of the socially shared unconscious, through events in the public realm, Fodor’s suggestions are more difficult to apply. In the public realm there are many more activities going on. It can be quite difficult to decipher what is relevant from what is not. Kottmeyer (1996) and Viéroudy (1977) noticed, however, that in the United States major UFO sightings tend to be related to concerns related to national security (which implies indirectly that we have a bunch a very psychologically repressed people in those milieus).

To go back to the Gulf Breeze incident, we have here again another case that tends to confirm the interpretation key for American cases. But because it was declared a fraud by many, key clues were missed. What was not studied is the symbolic signification of the sightings, including Walter’s alien visitation claims. His story is essentially about someone who is losing control over his life, and trying to get back control by making his story public. The symbolic structure of Walter’s life presents interesting parallels with key public events contemporary to the Gulf Breeze incident.

The first sighting occurred on 11 November 1987, on Veteran’s Day, which had a very special meaning for the Navy. Earlier that year 37 sailors of the USS Stark, a ship based in Florida, were killed in the Persian Gulf, in the context of the so-called Tanker War. It was one of the largest lost of life for the Navy since World War II. Emotions were certainly high on that day of 1987. These sailors died accidentally due to an Iraqi pilot who mistook the American ship for an Iranian one, but the U.S. Navy was there to fight the Iranians. Yet, at the same time the American government was accused of secretly selling weapons to Iran (Iran-Contra Gate). Feelings of betrayals among sailors were probably running very high.

What is more telling, however, is that there was a similar lost of control and scrambling to regain it during the same time period in and around the Office of the President. “The Democratic-controlled United States Congress issued its own report on November 18, 1987, stating that ‘If the president did not know what his national security advisers were doing, he should have.’ The congressional report wrote that the president bore ‘ultimate responsibility‘ for wrongdoing by his aides, and his administration exhibited ‘secrecy, deception and disdain for the law.’ It also read in part: ‘The central remaining question is the role of the President in the Iran-contra affair. On this critical point, the shredding of documents by Poindexter, North and others, and the death of Casey, leave the record incomplete’. “ (From Wikipedia)

The Gulf Breeze sightings occurred in a liminal time, i.e. when the content of a major public report was known by a few key players, but not released publically yet while there was serious tensions about national security in the Persian Gulf (a scenario similar to the Barney and Betty Hill story about the Transport Commission’s report and the Berlin crisis). Furthermore, it resembles a lot the October 1973 UFO wave, as there was a major conflict in the Middle East simultaneous to the Watergate scandal unfolding through the sudden resignations of the Secretary of Justice and his Deputy (as discussed in a previous post). In other words, this is another case in the United States of UFO wave concurrent to high level tensions about national security accompanied a major challenge to a key democratic institution.

Are these interpretation keys useful for future events? It is less than sure. Many days during the Bush administration would qualify for such context favourable to UFO wave (war in Iraq, war in Afghanistan, the 2004 elections, 9/11 commission, Abu Ghraib, CIA authorized torture, etc), but there was no major rash of UFOs between 2000 and 2008 in the United States. A possible explanation for the lack of major UFO sightings is that the lost of trust in the Executive branch during the Bush era was more gradual and therefore less prone to sudden major collective emotional discharges. As well, maybe the American society is now more cynical than before, so there was no big upset about what occurred. Another possibility is that other psi events replaced UFOs, but remained under the “radar screen” (e.g., more Bigfoot sightings, more ghosts, more Chuppacabra, etc.).

In the light of Fodor’s research, it appears to me that a number of UFO cases might have been “closed” too fast.nAs well, this shows that the generally shared ”intuition” about a link between governmental conspiracies and the UFO phenomenon might hold some truth after all. But not in the way that most people imagine: UFOs are not enacting conspiracies (to hide their existence), but rather it is conspiracies about mundane power issues that set the stage for UFO sightings, be they psychokinetic UFOs, hoaxes, or synchronistic passage of mundane aerial objects.

Copyright © 2009 Eric Ouellet

Some particular methodological challenges about psi

Welcome back to all. I hope you all had a great summer.

This post is based on an older but interesting article about researching psi, which provides interesting suggestions that I find useful for the study of UFOs and UFO waves. The article is:

Shewmaker, Kenneth L. and Carlton W. Berenda. (1962). “Science and the problem of psi”. Philosophy of Science 29(2): 195-203.

Psi as a human phenomenon

The article raises an important question about the notion of psi, which is still incompletely answered by present-day parapsychology: Can psi be studied scientifically? The real challenge with this question is, in fact, not about what psi is, but how one defines science. If science is defined as developing an organized body of knowledge about the fundamental dynamics of the universe (broadly defined), then psi can be studied scientifically. But if the study of the fundamental dynamics of the universe requires repeatable experimentation (i.e. at will) as a sine qua non condition, then psi cannot be studied scientifically because it is too elusive and unpredictable for experimentation. If this last and very narrow view of science is accepted, then not only parapsychology is in trouble, but also sociology, political science, anthropology, etc.

Most scientists now agree that the crux of the matter is not about experimentation, but about ontology (i.e. what are we dealing with). When one is dealing with humans, then there are a number of additional challenges not found in natural sciences that come up. Humans are creative and find innovative solutions that cannot be predicted; they self-define they own reality and therefore their behaviour is not easy to predict; human situations are always found in an open environment so that variables cannot really be controlled, or even all known; humans have unconscious mental processes that are hard to investigate but that have a lot of impact on their behaviour, preferences, etc. These additional challenges make experimentation almost useless when it comes to humans and thus other methodologies are required.

The point here is that psi is a human phenomenon and it should be studied by using the methodology of the human and social sciences rather than the one from natural science. The consequence of this is that those who have a narrow view of science will never be satisfied because they need experimentation or quasi-experimental setting to study any object of inquiry. If the object does not fit this mould, then they simply ignore the research done on the topic. It goes without saying that this issue is of paramount importance for the study of UFOs and UFO waves as psi effects. ETH ufologists, by definition, consider UFOs as physical objects that should be studied using the natural science approach. They tend to have a narrow (not to say naive) view of science, and therefore use that the experimentation criteria to reject other approaches (while themselves cannot produce any experimental data worth that name...). In other words, the centrality of the human dimension is usually completely ignored. As well, most ETH ufologists are not interested in understanding the ontological challenges linked to the UFO phenomenon (do they even know the existence of the word ontology?). Hence, it is further reason to accept that there is no point in trying to engage ETH ufology.

Some methodological suggestions

Shewmaker and Berenda take notice of some key issues about the study of psi. Psi cannot be produced “on demand” for very long (the well-known declining effect of psi first noticed by J. B. Rhine). The same problem exists in social psychology (e.g. one cannot repeat the same focus group experiment too many times with the same group, people get sick of it). Almost all ostentatious psi effects are unique events (like most social, political, and cultural events). As well, these psi effects tend to be spontaneous. Most parapsychologists think that it is because psi effects are dependent on unconscious mental processes that cannot be monitored simultaneously to the production of the effect. Spontaneous psi effects tend to have a symbolic content that cannot be interpreted objectively; it requires an in-depth understanding of the producer’s psyche and unconscious thoughts. Lastly, a number of parapsychologists consider that ESP effects, in particular, are constantly occurring, where psi-gathered information, normally gathered information, innovative thought and fantasy are always mixed up, which makes psi almost impossible to insulate from other variables and influences.

To deal with such challenges, they offer a number of solutions that are relatively closed to what has been proposed for parasociology so far. First, they proposed to use what they call “nondiscursive symbolism [which] has been used in the discussion of various art forms and for communicating the psycho-dynamics of individual patients in the psychological clinic” (p. 200). What this means is that the methodologies found in the symbolic interpretation of arts and dreams can be quite useful in understanding the uniqueness of a psi event. This has been already discussed about UFOs and UFO waves on this blog, and it is further arguments to continue to do so.

When it comes to individuals, they propose something that few parapsychologists have done so far (even in the case of poltergeists). “The course to pursue would seem, therefore, to be a truly intense psychological study of the person or persons involved in any reported incident of psi, not simply to determine the personality type but rather with the intent of a presentational understanding of the unique persons and the unique event. This is to suggest that clinicians “gang-up” on one reported psi incident, as soon after the fact as possible, making use of any or all clinical devices at their command. Special attention might be paid to such questions as: ‘What psychological meaning did the psi event have for this particular person at this particular time? What were the conditions of the interpersonal relationships at the time? What function did the psi event appear to serve for the persons involved?” (p. 201).

This suggestion is quite interesting and brings back to the forefront the case of Barney and Betty Hill, as they were the object of an intense psychological study by Dr. Simon and a significant portion of the data was made public in Fuller’s book. As shown in the previous posts about the Barney and Betty Hill case, the questions suggested by Shewmaker and Berenda are not only relevant, but most of them can be answered with the existing data from the Barney and Betty Hill hypnotic investigation! It is clear that true Close Encounters of the 3rd type (CE3) (i.e. involving BOTH seeing an object up close and their perceived passengers), as well as the so-called CE4, can be best studied through the approach proposed by Shewmaker and Berenda. The key, however, is to change the central question from “what can I learn about aliens and their spaceship” to “what can I learn about the people (and their deep mental processes) who can create macro psi effects”. This last question is a true scientific question, but about unique and spontaneous human phenomena.

Implications for parasociology

The questions proposed by Shewmaker and Berenda can be applied to social-level psi effects as well, although it would sociologists and anthropologists who should “gang up”. The questions would become: What sociological or cultural meaning did the psi event have for this particular society at this particular time? What were the conditions of the inter-group relationships at the time? What function did the psi event appear to serve for the society involved?

To offer some concrete illustration of this approach, the new case of seeing mermaids (yes, mermaids) in Israel will be used. The mermaid “wave” info can be found at: http://www.cryptomundo.com/cryptozoo-news/israel-mermaid/

This is an interesting variation to the UFO wave phenomenon. Inter-group relationships: there are a lot tensions in Israel about the Iranian nuclear programme, and the unclear plans of the West on how to deal with it. At the time of the sightings, there was not much talk about it in Israel (vacation season), but it was probably "cooking" in the collective unconscious. Sociological or cultural meaning: the symbolism is also interesting, as mermaids (like the devil) mislead people in the wrong direction while being attractive or inviting. What function: I think many people in Israel are coming to accept unconsciously the tempting yet dangerous notion that further diplomatic talks with Iran is a waste of time, although diplomatic talks appear to be the "righteous" way. Concretely, Israel might be getting the resolve to deal with the Iranian threat with or without Western support (with all the very serious consequences this might create for the Middle East and the world in general).

This is only a short illustration, but it shows that a parasociological approach can be used on a number phenomena.

Copyright © 2009 Eric Ouellet

Reading Notes – Parapsychology and the Unconscious

This post is reviewing a somewhat older parapsychology book that is made of previously published articles and book chapters from the 1950s up to the early 1980s by Jule Eisenbud, a now deceased but reknown parapsychologist. In spite that those texts were written some time ago, they are still relevant today as they seek to reconcile parapsychology and psychoanalysis, an incomplete task up to this day. Even if the focus remains on the individual unconscious, there are a number of useful notions for parasociology in general, and for the study of the UFO phenomenon in particular. The full notice is:

Eisenbud, Jule. (1983). Parapsychology and the Unconscious. Berkeley: North Atlantic Book.

Psi as continuously influencing the unconscious (both individual and social)

The author opens the introduction with a provocative thought from the eminent Cambridge University philosopher C.D. Broad, who once wrote in his book Religion, Philosophy and Psychical Research that: “our understanding of, our misunderstandings with, our fellow men; our general emotional mood on certain occasions; the ideas which suddenly arise in our minds without any obvious introspectable cause; our unaccounted immediate emotional reactions towards certain persons; our sudden decisions where the introspective motives seem equally balanced; and so on; all these may be in part determined by paranormal cognition and paranormal causal influences” (p. 11).

Such a statement is clearly appealing to parasociology, as paranormal interactions among human beings are the core topic of the discipline. Furthermore, as Eisenbud notes, C.D. Broad was not only making a statement about paranormal phenomena, but he was also showing “his conspicuous disregard of the dynamic role of the individual unconscious...” (p. 12). This last statement is an important one because it means that the individual unconscious is not an isolated island that would be only in relationship with others through “normal” communication channels. Furthermore, the individual unconscious is not only constructed through socialization and filled with collectively shared ideas, norms, values, beliefs, etc., but it is also in constant contact with others’ unconscious (both individually and collectively) through parapsychological means. From the psychoanalytical other side of the coin, Eisenbud considers that not only the issue of socialization needs to be taken into consideration much more comprehensively by psychoanalysts, but it is important to incorporate the “efforts of Freud, Jung and other psychoanalysts to draw attention to the significance for psychology of parapsychological data” (p. 12). In other words, psi effects, which are originating and emanating from the unconscious, constitute a core dynamic of the mutual interactions between individuals and their society.

Eisenbud highlights, in particular, the work of the Viennese psychoanalysts Wilhelm Stekel and Sigmund Freud who extensively investigated telepathic dreams in the 1920s. One of the interesting findings was that the so-called transference and counter-transference processes, where the patient and the analyst adjust to each other’s personality to create an effective therapeutic relationship, are also partly telepathic. Freud “convincingly showed that a patient in treatment was sensitive to material of concern to the analyst, and that the reaction which was evident in the patient’s associations—for instance jealousy—could be related dynamically to this material, just as if the patient had acquired conscious knowledge of what was taking place in the analyst’s mind. Other investigators soon extended these observations. The picture emerging from cumulative data [...] showed man’s paranormal capacities to be very much in the service of his adaptational needs.” (p. 20).

Additional researches were conducted later on by Ian Stevenson (Telepathic Impressions: A review and report of thirty-five new cases. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1970), and by Russian scientists (Vasiliev, L. Experiments in Distant Influence. New York: Dutton, 1976) that showed that people are actually influencing each other through paranormal means. As Eisenbud notes “through the domain of the ‘psychic pathology in everyday life’, in any case, man is seen as actively utilizing his latent paranormal capacities to bring about desired changes in his environment in the same way he uses other adaptational means at his disposal” (p. 21). This view of psi is very much in line with François Favre’s contention that psi is something very common, ordinary and natural, as discussed in previous posts.

This view of psi can have important consequences for the study of UFOs, if one considers that UFOs are a specific and idiosyncratic use of psi to provide some form of adaptation to our environment. Certainly, Méheust’s contention that UFOs, through the material generated in the sci-fi literature, expresses our collective concerns about our technological society appearing to be out of control can be further supported by this approach. In the same vein, one can find a direct linkage between the findings of Roll and others about poltergeists being generated by psi subjects through unconscious and unexpressed feelings of anger and frustration.

What is missing in Eisenbud’s approach, however, is the social nature of our interactions. Not only human interactions are mediated by socially shared language, culture, norms, values, ideas, etc, but they do occur also at a level that is properly sociological. For instance, interactions between social classes cannot be reduced to individual interactions. Commonly shared desires, sitting in a large number of individual unconscious minds, can have dynamics of their own. This can be observed in the emergence of ideologically driven movements, and there is already an extensive literature on this subject in political science. As well, the classical 1896 study of Le Bon of the crowd mentality also illustrates such dynamic very well. Is it possible, then, that large groups’ desire can produce social psi effects? It is possible to refer to a number of parapsychological studies to illustrate that it is indeed possible. The Global Consciousness Project certainly offers interesting insights. As well, the notion that there are more male births after a major disaster or a war is well established statistically, and has been perceived as a collective psi effect by some parapsychologists.

Methodological insights

These issues have discussed in earlier posts, leading to same roadblock based on the conflicting views of psychology versus sociology. However, Eisenbud also tried to relate his research with the work of anthropologists and brings some interesting methodological insights for the study of social psi. For him, “the objective of psi in primitive societies, however much the styles of its experience and use may vary between different ones, is to secure information and to gain control over external events. [...] This order is itself ‘magical’ in that categories of time, space and causality which constitute the framework of the primitive’s experience of reality, are far less rigid, far more infused with human thought and will, than the way in which these same categories are envisaged and experienced in non-primitive societies. To the primitive, thus, behaviours based upon power of thought and will to accomplish things are reality oriented. He simply makes use of processes considered inherent in the social order and the universe.” (p. 81)

Then Eisenbud offers a not so flattering contrast for Western societies stating that “paranormal experiences of various kinds, regardless of the belief systems of those involved, continue to be reported with quantifiable frequencies in highly developed Western societies which have no institutionalized means of integrating such experiences into their beliefs and practices [...]the useful information conveyed in the experiences, and the realistic benefits derived from them, are practically nil [...] the experiences themselves come to be regarded as freak occurrences, meaningless coincidences or at the most inexplicable intrusions from an only vaguely conceived supernatural realm” (pp. 81-82).

Seen from this perspective, then it becomes clear that ETH ufology, especially in its New Age form, represents an institutionalizing attempt to integrate the UFO phenomenon within a belief system. As Jacques Vallée has shown in his prophetic book Messengers of Deception, in a Western context such belief system can easily be manipulated for other purposes. In any event, what is key here is that the UFO phenomenon, as a particular idiosyncratic expression of the Western mind in the 20th and 21st centuries, is produced and integrated unconsciously as incidents rather than as an outcome of a conscious collective will. From a methodological standpoint, this supports further the notion that one needs to look into the content of the socially shared unconscious to understand the UFO phenomenon, and that looking around the phenomenon is more important than looking into the phenomenon itself.

Eisenbud also considers that traditional repeatability as a fundamental condition to produce scientifically valid knowledge is highly problematic when it comes to study the unconscious and psi effects. For him, psi capabilities are constantly in operation, which means that variables cannot be isolated. Psi subjects in parapsychological experiments have their unconscious psi capabilities operating before, during, after the experiment. Parapsychologists (and their staff) unconscious psi processes are in interactions with the ones of the subjects. Furthermore, for him, psi capabilities being found in unconscious processes are also “locked up” with our other impulses (death and aggression in particular) that are repressed through socialization to allow us to live in society. Metaphorically, psi is the treasure guarded by the dragon (impulses) in the remote castle (the unconscious). To get the treasure in full, then you have to unleash the dragon or kill it (to become a psychopath or a zombie). Hence, the best we can do is to sneak in the castle and steal a few pieces of gold while the dragon is sleeping (i.e. try to get the most out of spontaneous psi effects as they occur). It is in this context that he wrote that “the essential contradiction in attempting a repeatable experiment really lies in the fact—and this is the crux of the matter—that in so doing we are asking the ‘raw’ psi principles to serve two masters and to do two opposing things—to keep the laws and at the same time breaking them; or, put another way, we are asking psi, so to speak, to work against itself and to deliver into our hands the instrument of its overthrow”. (p. 162-163).

According to Eisenbud, we need to break away from the “rather too narrowly and rigidly slanted conceptual framework of the physical sciences” (p. 167). Better results can be achieved, from a methodological stand point, by focussing instead on the intent (both conscious and unconscious) of all those involved (including the experimenters). Parapsychologists have studied conscious intents and found limited correlations with psi results (see Heath 2003). However, they do not study unconscious ones because it requires more than a simple survey to collect data, and that’s where they miss the boat (which is Eisenbud key point). From the point of view of parasociology, there are some well-known methodological ways to assess collective unconscious intents through text analysis, participant observations, focus groups, and artwork analysis. These methods, like in the case of parapsychology, are not economical to study a single sighting, but are of interest for UFO waves (and are probably use to studying hauntings). In many ways, this is exactly what John Keel did when he researched the material for his book The Mothman Prophecy. And let me be clear here, once more, he was quite successful because he spent most of his energy looking around the phenomena.

Copyright © 2009 Eric Ouellet