Showing posts with label Sheldrake. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sheldrake. Show all posts

Sunday, December 13, 2009

Deep disturbances in morphic fields

This post is looking into a particular application of Rupert Sheldrake’s concepts of morphic field and resonance that may have significant value for parasociology. Sheldrake’s concepts have been developed to help describing at least three fundamental characteristics found in nature. The first one is about how new forms and behaviours become the norm within a specie, an issue that Sheldrake calls “formative causation.” The second is linked to the first one, is that new forms and behaviour emerge out of habits, and such habits accumulate through a collective memory not resident in the biological forms themselves. In other words, with time, a form or behaviour becomes a permanent fixture, and this is what he calls a “morphic field” (morphic meaning “something becoming into being”). The implication is that such form or behaviour is not pre-determined by mechanistic laws of nature, but rather emerges in ways that cannot be predicted, and looking in the brain or genes of specie will not lead to finding the memory repository. The last characteristic is that such habits spread within specie in “normal” ways, but also through “non-normal” ways that cannot be explained through mechanistic science. That is what he calls “resonance” and this is the part of his theory that got much of the criticism from the scientific establishment. Sheldrake also extended his theory to other notions outside biology, like how ideas spread among humans, and this led him into research about telepathy and ESP (i.e. examples of “non-normal” resonance).

There are a number of researches that certainly point in the same direction as Sheldrake’s theory. One of the most applicable of such researches for parasociology is the one conducted on monkey colonies in Japan by Lyall Watson. He observed the monkeys developing a new technique (i.e. animal showing capability for innovation) of washing food that was given to them. The findings are even more astonishing as the new learning spread to other islands (where the monkey colonies had no contact with each others), when a certain threshold is met. As stated by Watson:

“But the addition of the hundredth monkey apparently carried the number across some sort of threshold, pushing it through a kind of critical mass, because by that evening almost everyone in the colony was doing it [washing sweet potatoes]. Not only that, but the habit seems to have jumped natural barriers and to have appeared spontaneously, like glycerine crystals in sealed laboratory jars, in colonies on other islands and on the mainland in a troop at Takasakiyama.” (Watson 1979, 148).

Deep disturbances in morphic fields

One of the issues that Sheldrake’s theory is not well positioned to explain is how new fields come about. The explanations he offers are actually closer to a mystic discussion about a “super and primordial morphic field” that can be easily equated to the notion of divinity. Given that such notion implies a fundamental belief as the key assumption, it is clearly outside the bounds of the scientific realm. Yet, if we keep in mind Watson’s research, for the monkeys the arrival of sweet potatoes given by humans appeared to be god-given, yet is was not.

I think there is a better explanation and it could reconcile traditional science and Sheldrake’s perspective. New fields emerge when old fields are deeply disturbed. Such disturbances are caused by the surrounding environment of a given field, which environment is made of many fields (many of which are probably not even known). The interactions between these different fields are so numerous, complex and with fields that we are not even aware of, that it is impossible to predict in a mechanistic way what would come out of such interactions. Hence, given the human limited capacity to grasp highly complex systems, to consider them as random would just as good. If one prefers to call this randomness the “mysterious ways of God,” so be it, as it would not change the explanatory structure anyway.

In private correspondence with Rupert Sheldrake, he agreed with me that this notion of deep disturbances is congruent with his theories. The key here, is not trying to predict in a mechanistic way when disturbances will occur, as we cannot do so given the high degree of complexity, but rather to identify which kind of disturbances leads to particular field breakdowns. To use an analogy, one could think of a group of people playing poker at a table. The field (i.e. the game) has rules and the players, with time, known other players’ ways of hiding their nervousness. The group of players have an accumulated memory, and sometimes non-normal resonance might occur when the players guess correctly (through telepathy?) the real hand of another player.

Then the table is suddenly push up in the air from the bottom, all the cards and chips go up in the air, and fall down on the ground. This creates a liminal moment, the collective memory is temporary lost, and the game is suspended. Some time is spent to pick up the cards and chips, and the table is reset based on the players’ individual memory, which is likely not to be 100% what the collective memory had it before. During this liminal moment, it is very likely that some players might use the time to cheat (steal chips, lie about their hand, etc), as the power of the field is momentarily stopped, and anything can happen. Could, then, UFO waves, Marian apparitions or RSPKs be one of those liminal moment where anything can happen because some fields have been deeply disturbed?

Insights from a concrete example

In order to see what would be the fit of morphic resonance to understand some of the most difficult to explain paranormal phenomena, a concrete and mundane example is propose here. This is a bit of digression towards something else, but the insight for UFO and paranormal research is important.

I am using the example of Hurricane Katrina that hit New Orleans towards the end of August 2005. It is clearly a sudden and deep disturbance to a series of fields. But not all fields were actually disturbed, and not the ones that people usually tend to think of.

What happened with Katrina was a major physical event (i.e., a hurricane) that caused very deep disturbances to at least two physical fields, namely the “biological ecosystem to ensure survival “(access to food and drinkable water, dry places to rest, elimination of infectious material, etc.), and “physical communication infrastructures” (roads, phone lines, cellular towers, Internet cables, radio and TV stations antennas, etc.).

Several symbolic fields (i.e. human fields) were not disturbed after all, in spite of what the media were reporting at the time. The chaos and lawlessness on the ground was actually vastly exaggerated, although people’s suffering remained quite acute and real. A symbolic field that could be called “local solidarity” (people were helping each other according to many witnesses, many heroic acts) remained strong, and this was observed directly by anthropologists who came to help (Ethridge 2006) and by a series of subsequent surveys (Scott & Howitt 2006; Rodriguez, Trainor, & Quarantelli 2006). In other words, social order on the ground did not collapse.

Even the field of criminality remained what it is, even if it had expanded opportunity because the police was not functional due to the extensive damages to infrastructures. The looting occurred mostly in the few days after the storm when people’s situation became seriously desperate as there were no signs that help was coming (Lavelle & Feagin 2006; Sims 2007). This was survival, not criminality.

Finally, the ugliest part of it was that field of racism, which has a long history in Louisiana, that remained very strong as poor blacks were overwhelmingly affected by the events (before as they could not afford to evacuate, during as they were stuck there and the media portraying them as bad and ruthless, and after as they remain the least able to restore their life) (Lavelle & Feagin 2006; Sommers et al. 2006).

The symbolic field that was really affected was the one related to the power of those who have political authority: the government or the state (in its general meaning). The police, without its physical infrastructure could not function; the municipal, State and Federal governments were completely overwhelmed and seemed paralyzed in spite of having put in place a series of measures in the days prior to the hurricane. The general paralysis was so extensive that it is hard to explain without introducing the notion of “non-normal” morphic resonance.

The real interesting issue is that governmental auhtority (at all levels, and including the police and the military) has its power based in the capacity of using physical strength to impose its will; what we call order. Anyone having any education in political science will know that the state is best described by Max Weber’s classical definition: “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” (Gerth & Mills 1946, 78). As well, the modern state has very much developed as a morphic field through habits. As brilliantly described by Charles Tilly,

"[…] transition to direct rule gave rulers access to citizens and the resources they controlled through household taxation, mass conscription, censuses, police systems, and many other invasions of small-scale social life. But it did so at the cost of widespread resistance, extensive bargaining, and the creation of rights and perquisites for citizens. Both the penetration and bargaining laid down new state structures, inflating the government’s budgets, personnel, and organizational diagrams. The omnivorous state of our own time took shape." (Tilly 1992, 25).

It was very telling that the sense of “order” was re-established in New Orleans , not when people were actually safe but when people started “to see so many uniformed men bearing machine guns, patrolling expressways and major intersections” (Scott & Howitt 2006, 29). These soldiers did not have any legal capacities to play a police role, nor were they helping with the delivery of aid and evacuation of stranded people. They real effect was to re-establish state authority, a symbolic field fundamentally based on the potential use of physical violence.

What all this means is that (1) some symbolic fields are directly dependent on physical fields (i.e. state authority is dependent on physical force to coerce), (2) that resonance occurs between fields that are akin, or more closely dependent, and (3) resonance occurs also when there are deep disturbances, not only when there are new habits created.

Prospective findings

If Sheldrake is right, then his theory should also work the other way around, and this has a very direct consequence for parasociology: UFO waves, RSPKs, and Marian apparitions (to name a few) would be disturbances in the symbolic realm (national identity and psycho-social field of the family), which resonates directly in physical fields dependent on the disturbed symbolic fields (as there are strange physical manifestations that can be observed). In other words, a UFO wave or RSPK would be physical disturbances created through resonance by “symbolic hurricanes”. The key question, then, is: what are those physical fields that are directly dependent on symbolic fields? This puts a very interesting twist to the notions morphic fields and resonance.

Post-specific bibliography

Ethridge, Robbie. (2006). “Bearing Witness: Assumptions, realities and the otherizing of Katrina”. American Anthropologist 108(4): 799-813.

Gerth, H.H. and C.W. Mills. (1946). From Max Weber: Essays in sociology. New York: Galaxy Books.

Lavelle, Kristen and Joe Feagin. (2006). “Hurricane Katrina: The race and class debate”. Monthly Review 58(3): 52-67.

Littlefield, Robert S. and Andrea Quenette. (2007). “Crisis Leadership and Hurricane Katrina: The portrayal of authority by the media in natural disasters”. Journal of Applied Communication Research 35(1): 26-ff.

Rodriguez, Havidan, Joseph Trainor, and Enrico L. Quarantelli. (2006). “Rising to the Challenges of a Catastrophe: The emergent and prosocial behavior following Hurricane Katrina”. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604: 82-ff.

Scott, Esther and Arnold Howitt. (2006). “Hurricane Katrina: Responding to an ‘ultra-catastrophy’ in New Orleans”. Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government Case Program, Case no. C15-06-1844.0.

Sims, Benjamin. (2007). “’The Day After the Hurricane’: Infrastructure, order, and the New Orleans Police Department’s response to Hurricane Katrina”. Social Studies of Science 37(1): 111-118.

Sommers, Samuel R. et al. (2006). “Race and Media Coverage of Hurricane Katrina: Analysis, implications and future research questions”. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 6(1): 39-55.

Tilly, Charles. (1992). Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Watson, Lyall. (1979). Lifetide. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Eric Ouellet © 2009

Wednesday, December 2, 2009

Rupert Sheldrake’s The Presence of the Past

As announced a few posts ago, I am reviewing one of the main books of Rupert Sheldrake. The one chosen is trying to link observations in the social and cultural realms with his concept of morphic resonance. Although there are some interesting ideas in it, I must say that I am a bit disappointed, as it does not provide a whole lot more to what has already been discussed so far. Yet, it was still a worthwhile reading. The full notice is:

Sheldrake, Rupert. (1989). The Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature. New York: Vintage Books.

Morphic fields and sociology

This book represents further application of his biological ideas developed in A New Science of Life (1981) to the realms of psychology, society, and culture (p. vii). Yet, nearly half of the book is dealing with issues linked to the outdated 19th century mechanistic views of science that are still prevalent today. Among those views, one can find the hope of finding all the eternal and immutable laws of nature. For him, a central problem is that reality fundamentally changes, and thus our understanding of it must also evolve. It is to address this problem that he developed the notion of morphogenetic fields, which “evolve within the realm of nature, and they are influenced by what has happened before. Habits build up within them. From this point of view, mathematical models of these fields are only models; they do not represent transcendent mathematical realities that determine the fields” (p. 107).

Social sciences are about studying collective and long-lasting, but not eternal, idiosyncrasies which have “laws” of their own, but as these idiosyncrasies change over time, so the “laws” to explain them will change. If one translates in the language of the social science the above quote, it would look like this: social structuration in social classes evolves within societies, and is influenced by previous social forms. It is only with time that new social forms become accepted and integrated in a society, and the models and theories to explain them are specific to those societies, and do not determine social structuration. No one in social science would be shocked by such “translation”. It is certainly an issue and challenge for the natural sciences, but when it comes to the human and social sciences this is not a major issue.

Sheldrake appears aware of this, as he wrote later in the book, that sociology has abandoned in the 1960s such pretensions of finding eternal laws of society (pp. 254-255), especially through the disrepute of the functionalism and structuralism. From that point of view, it is clear that his book was not addressed to people in the social sciences. This is a bit disturbing, as they would be the only ones to be really able to embrace his concept in the context of what this books intend to do. It is unfortunate that Sheldrake missed such an opportunity to establish a dialogue with the social science community, but I guess his main “demons” were somewhere else...

This lack of dialogue appears to remain to this day. I did a relatively extensive search for social science journal articles that would use Sheldrake’s ideas, and to my surprise I found none. I think a number of reasons can be invoked to explain this situation: conservatism of those journals vis-à-vis his unconventional views (yet some of them in cultural studies are all but conservative); Sheldrake’s inability to reach out to the social science communities, as morphic resonance is expressed in ways that are not easy to integrate within existing models and theories from social sciences (something he recognizes himself – p. 309), etc. But I think the most important reason for this lack of interest is that Sheldrake’s ideas provide nothing new to the social sciences. This can be seen as a mixed blessing. On one hand, this confirms that most findings in sociology remain essentially valid, even with a morphic fields “update”. On the other hand, as it does not provide anything really new, then why should one bother using this concept?

Morphic fields and resonance in sociology

The notion of morphic field is actually quite similar to the way sociological concepts and theories are devised. Morphic fields are constructs that are comparable to the notions of social force and dynamics, which are common concepts in sociology to describe abstract realities that have a real impact, such as social classes, social institutions. But his approach is starting from the natural sciences and tries to go towards the social sciences. As Sheldrake wrote, “the hypothesis of formative causation, which the rest of this book explores, starts from the assumption that morphogenetic fields are physically real, in the sense that gravitational, electro-magnetic, and quantum matter fields are real” (pp. 107-108). It would be interesting to do the reverse exercise, using social science concepts to describe biology.

What morphic fields do, as a concept, is to provide an explanatory structure to understand why biological shapes and behaviours remain the same over time, and that they tend to spread without always have a direct cause-and-effect to account for it. Within a morphic field, there is a process that makes it stronger and more established through time, which he calls morphic resonance. “Morphic resonance takes place on the basis of similarity. The more similar an organism is to previous organisms, the greater their influence on its morphic resonance. And the more such organisms there have been, the more powerful their cumulative influence” (p. 108). In other words, according to Sheldrake, the more nature is the same, the more it will remain the same. This idea, once transposed, is very similar to the underpinnings of concepts such as primary and secondary socialization, and of institutionalization in sociology, which are built on the notion of repetition.

Sheldrake adds that “by contrast, the hypothesis of formative causation postulates a two-way flow of influence: from fields to organism and from organism to fields” (p. 110). What he means here is that not only the overall structure of the field influences individual organisms in terms of the shape and behaviour, but individual organisms also influence the field. Here too, there is nothing new for sociology. The overall construct of sociological theories is based on that very notion of a two-way process, where the structural and functionalist theories emphasize the top-down part of social processes, while the agency-based and critical theories are all about understanding how individuals can voluntarily induce social change.

For organisms to keep their shape and behaviour over generations, Sheldrake postulates that some sort of memory is required so that organism “knows” what to do. Hence, morphic fields are also memory containers. But he goes further in saying that the information contained in the field seems to spread without always having direct cause-and-effect. “Morphic fields play a role comparable to information and programs in conventional biological thought, and they can indeed be regarded as fields of information. Thinking of information as contained in morphic fields helps to demystify this concept, which otherwise seems to be referring to something that is essentially abstract, mental, or mathematical, or at any rate non-physical in nature” (p. 113). Once again, through key concepts like class and professional socialization, or Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, one knows that social behaviour is filled with information (such as rules of conducts, norms and values). Sheldrake acknowledges this similarity (p. 262). The main difference is the non-causal spread of information which is not really discussed in sociology. More on this below.

One more point, Sheldrake denounces strong determinism through his concept of morphic fields. If organisms tend to have similar shapes and behaviour, they do not have the exact same. There is room for variation (like African pigmies and tall Scandinavians are still part of the same specie). He wrote that “an essential feature of morphic fields is that they are intrinsically probabilistic; in other words they are not sharply defined but are ‘structures of probability” (p. 119). What he means is that within the range of possible outcomes that a field can tolerate, it is impossible to predict how a specific organism or individual would behave. This notion is well understood in sociology. For instance, someone who is born in a working class background has a greater probability to have later on habits, language, demeanour, employment, and housing congruent with what exists in general in the working class. But there are always a number of individual who will arrive to a different outcome, some to become very rich and powerful. Yet, it is impossible to predict which individual will change social class in such a way.

Sheldrake acknowledges that his theories are difficult to test in a human setting as there are too many variables at play (pp, 183, 186-187, and 188). As well, he recognizes that social and cultural realities, if they can be understood as morphic fields, they have to be studied in their own terms. As he underlines, “social and cultural fields are of a nature similar to the morphic fields that organize biological and chemical systems, although they are not, or course, reducible to these biological and chemical fields. Like the morphic fields of systems at all levels of complexity, social and cultural fields are stabilized by morphic resonance from similar systems in the past [...]” (pp. 254-255). Lastly, he recognizes that his concept of morphic fields does not explain well how new morphic fields emerge, while in social science the issue of how social change occur is the fundamental question (pp. 114 and 246).

A bridge not so far

In spite of these limitations, I think Sheldrake provides some interesting points that would be well received in social sciences, or at least better received than in natural sciences. For instance, Sheldrake provides a convincing analysis to show that the notion of instinctive behaviour through genetic explanation is over-rated (p. 158), and this is congruent with the devastating critique opposed to socio-biology.

As well, Sheldrake is very critical of those who try to reduce human behaviour to brain chemistry; a critique whole-heartily shared by most sociologists. “According to the hypothesis of formative causation, the morphic fields that organize our behaviour are not confined to the brain, or even the body, but extend beyond it into the environment, linking the body to the surroundings in which it acts” (p. 198).

Another linkage can be made with the study of social institutions, a key notion in sociology and anthropology. The famous anthropologist Mary Douglas described in her master piece on social institutions, How Institutions Thinks (1987), how institutions does the thinking for individuals in providing mental thought patterns as to how we should look at the world; what she called the classification schemes. Sheldrake proposes a similar construct to understand how information is stored in morphic fields. “From the point of view of the hypothesis of formative causation, such schemata, hierarchies, or organizational factors can be regarded as morphic fields, organized in hierarchies and connected together in multiple ways through higher fields” (p. 200). Institutions behave in a manner that is congruent with the morphic field explanatory structure.

Sheldrake provides also an interesting way of re-energizing Durkheim’s concept of conscience collective, which has lost favour in sociology. Conscience collective is used to describe something that could be also called group mind, to explain social behaviour. Conscience collective could be seen as a morphic field containing the conscious collective memories of a society (pp. 248-255), and that is built and maintained through ongoing generations of people getting the same story about their society (be it true or not, like in the case of nationalism, or Canada is the “most best” country in the world...).

Morphic fields and resonance and parasociology

Where Sheldrake becomes more contentious is where, I think, he is becoming more interesting for the purpose of parasociology. One of the key aspects of morphic fields is that the content of the information found in the field is not necessarily communicated through a normal cause-and-effect process. For instance, he considers that all individuals inherit their species’ collective memory (p. 159), but such memory is not necessarily stored physically and that the past can influence the present directly (p. 160). As he wrote, “if the hypothesis of formative causation is correct, then it should be possible for habit memories of one organism to influence another by morphic resonance, facilitating the acquisition of the same habits. Such an effect would not, of course, be expected on the basis of mechanistic theories of memory storage” (p. 168)

To support his view that collective knowledge is shared through non-direct means, he provides the example of some research done of unconnected groups of rats learning faster over several generations how to get through a maze (p. 175-176). As well, he presents the research on blue tits birds opening milk bottle foil caps, first noticed in 1921 and spreading across the UK and some parts of Europe. These birds are known to travel only within a short distance from their nests (pp. 177-178). Although he agrees that normal animal learning had occurred in this case, an additional explanation is required for birds learning the trick at the same time while living far from each other. This is an important nuance. Sheldrake does not say that “normal” explanations are not good, only that they need to be complemented by something like morphic resonance for what it cannot account for. This perspective reminds me of Brunstein’s (1979) notion that there is a need for an “Einsteinian” revolution in other fields like biology and psychology, and I would add in sociology too.

When it comes to people, Sheldrake wrote that “[...] the principal way in which we are influenced by morphic resonance from other people may be through a kind of pooled memory“(p. 221), and he links his views to Jung’s notion of collective unconscious. Unfortunately, he does explain much how this is occurring, and the verification tests he proposes to validate his ideas in the human realm are less than convincing. But this is certainly congruent with the parasociological notion that social order is, in part, possible through psi linkages.

Overall, what he proposes is that there are unknown and unseen dimensions at play, and morphic fields helps us to sense their presence. These invisible dimensions have been hypothesized in physics (p. 297) through various theories, including the notion of non-locality (p. 304). By logical extension, there should be additional sociological dimensions that are invisible, but still having an effect on societies. This is certainly the goal of parasociology to investigate such invisible dimensions. The concept of morphic resonance can be useful, but it needs to be tested empirically in a true sociological context.

Paranormal phenomena are good candidates for such empirical testing, as the “normal” explanations are not working. UFO sightings, hauntings and alien abductions share many characteristics of morphic fields. The content of such experience is carried on in a non-causal way, and tends to stabilize over time but never become perfectly identical; the more people believe in it, the more it occurs; some individuals (like Barney and Betty Hill) can have an influence on the field, as the field can influence many, etc. With respect to spontaneous but relatively short-live paranormal events like UFO wave and RSPKs (poltergeists), Sheldrake’s concept is maybe less helpful, as it has to describe new, intense but short-lived fields. Maybe these are special forms of morphic field, or example of abrupt disruption in morphic fields. In ecology, for instance, when an ecosystem is seriously damaged, it is possible to observe very strange animal behaviours (like polar bear eating their cubs). On the human side, the days after Katrina in New Orleans also showed what could happen when social order is shattered by environmental destruction. If these examples are good illustration of deep disruptions of morphic fields, then the analogy for UFO wave and RSPKs may hold.


Eric Ouellet © 2009

Tuesday, September 29, 2009

UFOs, Synchronicity and Morphic Fields

This post examines the notions of synchronicity and morphic field in the context of UFO sightings. If the UFO phenomenon is essentially a psi-related reality, then synchronistic events should be associated with it. Such association, then, should be investigated seriously. What it means is that witnesses may actually have misperceived a mundane object and interpreted it as an ET spaceship. In such circumstances, the ETH ufologist would typically discard such sighting, and ignored any data coming out of it. ETH ufologists (and sceptics) would simply call this a mere coincidence.

But does it really matter if the UFO is actually a misperception or a truly unexplainable aerial phenomenon? I would propose that it does not matter much as long as the experience can be understood as a synchronistic event. One needs to look if the perception of a UFO at that very time could have been a meaningful event that relates to other part of the witnesses’ life. Why, because one should be aware that it is how many psi events start. Meaningful but mundane acausal events can lead to PK effects because ultimately they originate from the same unconscious processes. A single misperceived mundane object might not be a relevant point of data, but when it is put in perspective with several other data points, it might become very relevant. From a methodological standpoint, this implies significant changes as to how UFO events should be investigated. Not only UFO frauds or hoaxes (as discussed a few posts ago) should be included in any serious research but also UFO synchronistic (yet mundane) events.

The idea that synchronistic events surround the UFO phenomenon is not new, however. Raymond Fowler, famous for having investigated the Andreasson affair , wrote a book on how synchronicity was occurring in his life and he his UFO research (Fowler, Raymond. 2004. Synchrofile. Lincoln: iUniverse). John Keel, when investigating for the Mothman Prophecy also noted many synchronistic events around him. Scott Rogo, while researching for Haunted Universe had a few very troubling synchronistic events. Bertrand Méheust started his classic book on UFOs out of a synchronistic event.

To get a better sense as to how synchronicity can be integrated into parasociology in general, and the study of UFOs in particular, a closer look at synchronicity is required. Today’s post is inspired by a short but interesting book on the notion of synchronicity. I certainly recommend it for anyone who wants to have a good and clear introduction to this notion. The full notice is:

Combs, Allan and Mark Holland. (1996). Synchronicity: Through the eyes of science, myth and the trickster. New York: Marlow.

Synchronicity as a matter of perspective

The notion of synchronicity has been used in modern physics to describe the famous Bell’s inequalities. John Bell found that when two particles in the same quantum state are pushed through a splitter, their spin (quantum self-rotation) varies in the same way even if they are in a different position and have a different velocity. They appear to be linked by a non-causal property that is call in physics synchronicity or non-locality. In other words, what is perceived at the local level (the particles) can be only understood by a nonlocal understanding of reality (pp. 14-15). The physicist David Bohm proposed that synchronicity is a matter of perspective. If one transposes the splitter experiment from a four dimension construct into a six dimension universe, then the two particles become two different views of the same particle, which explains the paradox discovered by Bell. The key here is to understand that a six dimension universe cannot be imagined by the human mind. It is only a mathematical abstraction, but it is also an acceptance that there are other forces at play in the universe and that it requires a different approach to take stock of them.

If this general principle is extracted out of physics and applied to human life, this raises many interesting issues. One of them is that synchronistic events can be seen as outcomes of a morphic field (as discussed in a previous post, see also Sheldrake 1981; 2006). The morphic field becomes a descriptor for those additional dimensions beyond the usual four. There is also some empirical evidence to show that the notion of morphic field can be used that way. Combs and Holland mentioned some interesting experiments that involved mice, which at every generation they became more effective at finding their way out of a maze (p. 25). Another set of experiments was a hidden picture that was easier to recognize by people outside Europe after it was shown on British television. Somehow the knowledge was integrated into a morphic field (p. 27). Arthur Koestler, the well-known author and parapsychologists, also proposed that all ESP events were forms of synchronicity, in a way congenial Jung’s notion of Absolute Knowledge, which itself can be considered as super-morphic field.

The issue of psychokinesis (PK), however, is more complex. Combs and Holland underlined an approach proposed by Suzanne Padfield, who “ believes that the influence of thought upon material events is actually based on physical brain processes—that patterns of brain activity occurring at the molecular or atomic level tend to bring about similar patterns of external world activity. Such patterns ‘ are connected in a similarity space in which distances are defined by degree of similarity and where time and space do not automatically appear at all” (p. 35). This idea is not new. It is actually a very old one akin to the belief in the power of prayer, and more recently discussed in the book and movie The Secret. Human will can both tap into and influence morphic fields. In this context, the distinction in parapsychology between ESP and PK could be based on the notion of information exchange. ESP is mostly characterized by taking information out of a morphic field, while PK is rather characterized by inputting information in a morphic field.

Multi-level synchronicity as morphic field information exchange

By following the same logic, one could construe UFO events as an exchange of information. A substantial emotional upset in a community inputs information in a morphic field which eventually leads to a PK event (i.e. UFO sighting) while at the same time the individuals (who may have nothing to do with the original emotional outburst) “catch” information from the morphic field, and thus explaining the paranormal events linked to UFO sightings (e.g., premonition and dreams of UFOs, be there at right place and right time, synchronistic events before UFO sightings, and UFO repeaters who could be seen as more “in touch” with this type of morphic field).

This way of looking at the UFO experience goes much beyond what Combs and Holland discussed. But it can help to resolve an apparent paradox illustrated by the 30 year-old debate between Bertrand Méheust and François Favre. As discussed in previous posts, Méheust considers that people who see UFOs are truly witnesses of an event for which they have no impact on. This view is supported by the fact that many key symbolic elements in UFO sightings appear to have no meaning for the individual witnesses, but do have a meaning for their community or society. On the other hand, as François Favre underlined, the UFO experience is very often surrounded by paranormal events (premonition, telepathy, synchronicity, Oz factor, etc) directly linked to the witnesses. It is Favre's contention, therefore, that people who see UFOs have something to do with it (or in his terminology, they are psi-subjects). The notion of information exchange between a society and individuals through a morphic field would resolve this paradox. And quite frankly, it could be a foundational concept for parasociology applicable to other macro psi effects such as hauntings, RSPK (poltergeist), Bigfoot sightings, etc.

Archetypes versus morphic fields

The question would then shift to how societies “connect” to a morphic field. One of the usual answers is linked to the notion of an archetype being activated, as proposed by Carl Jung. As discussed in a previous post, the use of archetype can be highly problematic when it is situated at the sociological level. But if the notion that societies tend to input more into a morphic field than extracting from it, while it tends to be the reverse for individuals is correct, then maybe the Jungian “mistake” makes more sense. A major collective emotional discharge is not activating a social archetype it rather creates the conditions of archetypes at the individual level to be activated along the same line of resonance within a given morphic field. This is in line with what I wrote in the last post: “A symbol’s potential strength within a specific society, at a specific time of its history, is the key to interpretation rather than its presumed universal and timeless meaning”. In other words, the concept of archetype is a useful one at the individual level, but should be abandoned for the sociological level. The more plastic and dynamic notion of morphic field is definitely more effective at the sociological level. This perspective is certainly more coherent with what is known from the social sciences. However, the hard question as to why a few collective emotional discharges give rise to macro psi effects, while most of them do not remains to be answered.

How individuals connect to a morphic field is better understood, given the extensive research done in parapsychology. Just to name a few, one can underline the unconscious belief, facility to dissociate or suspend the intellect, exposure to electro-magnetic fields, strong and unresolved unconscious conflicts, etc. Yet, like for the sociological level, the hard question as to why some individual produce psi effects while others do not in similar circumstances remains unanswered as well.

The presence of synchronistic events, however, should be retained as a key indicator for future research.

Eric Ouellet ©2009

Thursday, July 9, 2009

UFOs, the unconscious and morphic fields

As discussed in several previous posts, a better understanding of the inner dynamics of social psi is required to develop a comprehensive explanation of the UFO phenomenon. In turn, a better understanding of the shared unconscious processes is required to study social psi effects. Yet, studying the unconscious, shared or individual, represents a significant challenge. Two different authors are used here to provide some interesting conceptual notions for the understanding of the social unconscious dynamics: Otakar Machotka and Rupert Sheldrake.

Further insights about the unconscious

If we want to discuss the content of the unconscious using the language of reason (i.e. of consciousness) then we face the problem of translation. The unconscious is the realm of emotions and symbolism, where analytical logic is of limited use. Even defining the unconscious is problematic. I found, however, an interesting definition in a sociological but long forgotten book by Otakar Machotka, The Unconscious in Social Relations: An analysis of unconscious processes in personality, society, and culture (New York: Philosophical Library, 1964). Machotka defines the unconscious as “unresponsive, undiscriminating, conditioned, subliminal, unattending, insightless, unremembering, unlearned, unrecognized, ignored, and unavailable to awareness” (p. xxi). In other words, the unconscious plays by its own rules, it is naive and on auto-pilot, and works in parallel to consciousness.

Machotka also introduced a short but useful discussion on the issue of tensions in the unconscious. Both individuals and societies can experience “the feeling of tension which may arise 1) between two different ideas, norms, values, obligations, ties, or attitudes, 2) between an idea, norm, value, obligation, tie or attitude, and a reality, 3) between those and the tendencies, drives, and wishes of the personality” (p. 149). Then he adds that “As long as the tension-feeling is weak or mild, it generally is unconscious or operates unconsciously. But even strong tension-feelings sometimes may remain unconscious or disguised. Unconscious tension-feelings are with us most of the time despite general inclination of the human personality to remove or reduce tensions” (pp. 149-150). For him, these tensions are resolved unconsciously, most of the time, by the selection of norms, values, etc., that are the most appropriate socially. Hence, for Machotka the unconscious is also socialized and contributes to maintaining existing social norms.

What Machotka does not discuss, however, is when there is a tension between an idea, norm, value, etc., and a reality unconsciously known but yet to occur. In other words, what happen when there is new knowledge acquired by psi means (and therefore residing in the unconscious) that is in conflict with the norms and values also found in the unconscious? Furthermore, it is also possible to think that if such knowledge acquired through psi means creates a strong tension it will remain unconscious, as both components of the tension are specific to the realm of the unconscious.

If Machotka is right, then this has significant implications for the study of UFOs, and parasociology in general. If the original psi effect is the pre-cognition of emotionally charged events, then as pre-cognition tends to work better in the short term, UFO events and dates of significant events are important indicators (as in the case of Barney and Betty Hill, the Black Thursday, and the events linked to the Mothman Prophecy described by John Keel ). In this context, UFOs are an attempt to resolve the tension by the unconscious and by bypassing consciousness, but to alert the consciousness which has greater ability to deal with tensions. UFOs are possibly a last resort option for the unconscious, or believed to be so by the unconscious. Hence, UFOs are rather symptoms of a (social) problem present or future, rather than a meaningful phenomenon in itself.

The original psi effect leading to the acquisition of new information, however, can be of more than one source (e.g. unconscious telepathy between people, access to the Absolute Knowledge, etc.). It is likely that the idiosyncratic nature of the information will inform the nature of the macro psi effects, which are idiosyncrasies too (e.g. UFO, ghosts, Virgin Mary, ghost ship, Mothman, etc). For the researcher, the challenge is to bring to the consciousness the psi generated information and link it to the paranormal events. In the case of precognitive social psi and UFOs, it is probably easier because the information will become publicly known in the short term. Similarly, in the case of poltergeists, family or work tensions can be found easily too. But for many other phenomena it may be locked up in people’s unconscious forever, or the phenomenon is actually a synthetic PK form drawing on multiple sources (as Rogo (1986: 91-113) found out in the case of poltergeist hauntings).

Lastly, this also means that the occurrence of shared psi information about an event to come cannot be predicted, nor the unconscious calculus that there is no other options than using PK to express the tension (because it is based on what the unconscious believes to be true), and therefore it is probably safe to say that for ontological reasons UFO sightings and waves cannot be predicted through reasoned analysis. In the light of the above discussion, the best that can be done in terms of prediction is to identify conditions that are favourable to the emergence of macro PK effects, which may or may not take the form of a UFO sighting or wave. However, UFO sightings and waves can be explained after the fact (like most social phenomena).

Rupert Sheldrake and morphic fields

Rupert Sheldrake is a biologist who became parapsychologist (like J.B. Rhine), and became famous for writing A New Science of Life (London: Victoria Works, 1981). Sheldrake postulates that “all self-organizing systems are wholes made up of parts, which are themselves wholes at a lower level, such as atoms in molecules and molecules in crystals. The same is true or organelles in cells, cells in tissues, tissues in organs, organs in organisms, organisms in social groups. At each level, the morphic field gives each whole its characteristic properties, and interconnects and coordinates the constituent parts. The fields responsible for the development and maintenance of bodily form in plants and animals are called morphogenetic fields. In animals, the organization of behaviour and mental activity depends on behavioural and mental fields. The organization of societies and cultures depends on social and cultural fields. All these kinds of fields are morphic field” (Sheldrake 2006, 32).

Sheldrake also considers that there is a psi field, and I would add that like I discussed in a previous post there is also a social psi field that is arranged in fractal way with the individual psi fields. For Sheldrake, as well as for Dean Radin, we are all connected through this field, but our connection is greater when there is a social bond between people. Morphic fields are also stronger as they become habits, and unconscious routines. This led him to study telepathy through the pre-cognition of phone calls (being more effective when the caller is a known person), and animals coming back to their master, even if separated by hundreds or thousands of kilometres. Sheldrake also studied the feelings of being stared at, which implies that someone else tries to get closer and thus disturbs the field.

This is a neat concept for parasociology that also postulates that there is a “social glue” at the psi level. It is useful to study psi effects in close knit societies, but also when the social psi field is being disturbed by emotionally charged events perceived by the unconscious. Sheldrake’ s concept of morphic field can also help to explain that when there are less entrenched social habits because there is social ongoing change, weak social fields are generated. This in turn can explain that UFOs may have been less prevalent in the last 15 to 20 years because globalization and homogenization of cultures are in full swing (i.e. we are beyond the initial shock). UFOs, or other paranormal phenomena, will return probably when a new “normal” will be established and then disturbed. In any event, looking for a “strong” social field that is disturbed by social psi effects remains an interesting indicator for the study of UFOs.

I would also use Sheldrake`s concept to explain hauntings, and thus maybe the so-called CE4 or alien abductions (as well as other paranormal events that share a similar narrative structure). Hauntings can be a social psi field that became routinized by people believing that a specific house is haunted. This habit can be passed from one generation to the other, and explaining how a house can be haunted for decades or even centuries. Sheldrake`s concepts helps to reinforce my contention that hauntings are actually social events part of a social structure, while being a PK reality as well. The more people talk about the ghost, and the more they research death people’s life to “fill in the blanks” the stronger the psi fields will become, reinforcing its specific idiosyncratic content (i.e., the ghost of Mr. X). Could it be possible that alien abductions are also routinized psi effects, part of a particular psi field? This would explain the persistence of the phenomenon, as well as its fairly consistent narrative structure. The more the phenomenon is discussed and formalized, the more its idiosyncratic content stabilizes. This would also explain that in spite the relative decline of UFO sightings the number of CE4 events remains relatively stable. UFOs sightings and CE4 would be only linked by the assigned idiosyncratic content (ETs), but are generated through different social psi processes.

Copyright © 2009 Eric Ouellet